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By Kenneth Miller and david niven
1
W
ere the jury made up of experienced
death penalty lawyers, it might under-
stand these instructions . . . in the way
that the Court understands them. - Jutice
Breyer1
The right to a jury of one’s peers is fundamental
for those accused of criminal wrongdoing.  For those
charged with a capital crime, a jury may be all that
stands between the defendant and a sentence of death.
However, a jury pool that systematically excludes mem-
bers of certain races or individuals with reservations
concerning the death
penalty cannot be said to
satisfy the Sixth Amend-
ment.  Likewise, a jury that
cannot understand the law
it must follow, as set forth
in legal instructions, cannot
fulfill this vital function of
democracy, nor does such a
jury provide a defendant a
meaningful Sixth Amend-
ment right to a jury trial.
Yet it is almost a truism that
jurors do not understand
their legal instructions and
that juries are hardly repre-
sentative bodies.
Jury instructions, by and large, are written by
committees of lawyers, or are quoted verbatim from
statutory or case law.  The result is jargon-ridden lan-
guage that lawyers might understand, but laypersons
certainly would not understand.  It is no surprise that so-
cial scientists have demonstrated repeatedly that, in a
myriad of settings using diverse methods, jurors do not
understand the instructions that are intended to guide
them.  Researchers are not alone here; jurors themselves
register their confusion by requesting clarification from
trial judges.  The criminal justice system, however, has
been slow to respond, and appellate courts continue to
“presume” that jurors understand their instructions, even
when jurors ask pointed questions regarding the mean-
ing of those same instructions.  Moreover, capital pro-
ceedings continue, with the passive or direct support of
the Court, to assemble jury panels dramatically skewed
relative to the community as a whole.  The Supreme
Court, in a series of decisions beginning with Apprendi
v. New Jersey,2 has expanded the role of juries in the
criminal sentencing process, granting juries many pow-
ers previously relegated to judges.  Following Ring v.
Arizona,3 capital juries must be given the task of deter-
mining whether the prosecution has established the rel-
evant aggravating circumstances that would make the
defendant eligible for the
death penalty.  The Court
has also decided to expand
the role of juries under the
federal criminal sentencing
guidelines.  We argue that
the expansion of Sixth
Amendment rights is nec-
essarily bad, but we are
concerned with and will
explore the implications of
expanding the role of juries
in capital, as well as other
criminal cases, when juries
are not given sufficient
tools with which to work.
Specifically, juries cannot
hope to fulfill their duties when they do not understand
their instructions, when no effort is made to clarify those
instructions, and when juries under-represent certain
segments of the population.
In short, the Supreme Court has expanded a de-
fendant’s right to a jury in capital cases without com-
mensurate attention to the obligations on government
that would make that right meaningful.  The legal and
social science literature is replete with commentary and
research on the alarming lack of understanding that ju-
rors demonstrate in capital and other criminal cases.4
The fact that death qualification and voir dire exclude
certain members of society has been demonstrated re-
peatedly.  Likewise, the literature is fairly consistent in
praising the expansion of a criminal defendant’s Sixth
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Amendment rights.  What we show, however, is that
when these two trends are laid side by side, there is a
troubling – even glaring – lack of congruity between the
expansion of the Sixth Amendment and any effort to
make that right meaningful.  
More to the point, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas, seem particularly willing to expand Sixth
Amendment rights without thought to corresponding
governmental obligations to animate that right.  The col-
lective jurisprudence of Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
in one area is completely uninformed by their jurispru-
dence in another area.  This leads to quite troubling im-
plications regarding the justice of capital and other
criminal trials.
The Sixth Amendment guarantees the right to a
trial by jury for the criminally accused.  But what is the
nature of that right?  It is not enough to say that the jury
determines the defendant’s guilt or innocence, for the
Sixth Amendment means much more – and less – than
the mere determination of guilt.  Indeed, the nature and
extent of a criminal defendant’s right to a jury has
changed considerably over time.  It was not until 1970,
when the United States Supreme Court decided In re
Winship, that the familiar “reasonable doubt” standard
became a constitutionally required element of criminal
due process.5 After reflecting on a long tradition of
using the reasonable doubt standard in criminal trials in
the United States, the Court found it necessary to state:
“[l]est there remain any doubt about the constitutional
stature of the reasonable-doubt standard, we explicitly
hold that the Due Process Clause protects the accused
against conviction except upon proof beyond a reason-
able doubt of every fact necessary to constitute the crime
with which he is charged.”6 After Winship, then, a crim-
inal defendant appeared to have a constitutional right to
a jury determination of his or her guilt “beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.”7
However, the Court complicated matters in an
opinion written by Rehnquist, 8 when it failed to over-
turn a state statute that increased the sentence of a per-
son convicted of a felony by five years based on a
judicial finding – by a preponderance of the evidence –
that the person “visibly possessed” a firearm.9 The
Court reasoned that the “visible possession” of a firearm
portion of the statute was not an element of the crime;
rather, it was a “sentencing consideration” and did not
subject the defendant to a greater penalty than he would
have been subject to otherwise under the statute.10 Rehn-
quist stated that because they “concluded that Pennsyl-
vania may properly treat visible possession as a
sentencing consideration and not an element of any of-
fense, we need only note that there is no Sixth Amend-
ment right to jury sentencing, even where the sentence
turns on specific findings of fact.”11 In other words, the
criminal defendant’s Sixth Amendment right was lim-
ited to jury determinations of elements of the crime, not
sentencing considerations, and the distinction between
elements of the crime and sentencing considerations was
a matter of statutory construction.  The only limit
McMillan placed on a sentencing consideration was that
it not impose a sentence beyond the maximum allowed
by the underlying charge.
The McMillan decision left open the question of
whether, upon conviction for first degree murder, a per-
son was entitled to a jury determination of any facts that
could expose him or her to a death sentence.  In Walton
v. Arizona (1990),12 the Court considered Arizona’s cap-
ital sentencing scheme, which called for a judge to de-
termine the existence of aggravating factors during the
sentencing phase of a first-degree murder trial.  If the
judge found at least one aggravating factor, the defen-
dant was eligible for the death penalty and would avoid
that sentence only if the judge found sufficient mitigat-
ing circumstances that called for leniency.  The Court
upheld this capital sentencing scheme, stating that the
factors that led to a death sentence were not elements,
but sentencing considerations that did not entitle a de-
fendant to a jury consideration.  Accordingly, the Court
concluded that the sentencing scheme did not violate the
Sixth Amendment.13
Thus, after Walton, it was clear that a defen-
dant’s sentence could be increased up to and including
death if that sentence was one that fell within the
charged crime’s sentencing range even if a judge rather
than a jury found the facts necessary to increase the sen-
tence, and even if the judge found the necessary facts
by a standard of proof less rigorous than beyond a rea-
sonable doubt.  What was left unanswered by Walton,
however, was whether a defendant’s sentence could be
increased beyond McMillan’s ‘statutory maximum.’
The Court addressed just such a question in Jones v.
United States (1999),14 when the defendant was con-
victed of a federal carjacking, a statute that carried with
it a maximum sentence of fifteen years.  The defendant
was eventually sentenced to twenty-five years after a ju-
dicial finding that serious bodily injury had occurred
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during the course of the crime.15 On appeal, the Court
concluded that the finding of “serious bodily injury” was
an element of the crime rather than a mere sentencing
consideration because, after an analysis of similar fed-
eral criminal statutes, “Congress probably intended se-
rious bodily injury to be an element defining an
aggravated form of the crime.”16 Accordingly, Jones
stood for the proposition that if a defendant’s sentence
increased because of statutorily constructed elements (as
opposed to sentencing considerations) the defendant
was entitled to a jury determination beyond a reasonable
doubt on the facts necessary to support those elements.17
Although Jones could be seen as a decision fa-
vorable to defendants, the extent of the Sixth Amend-
ment right after Jones was somewhat truncated.  A
defendant was clearly entitled to a jury determination
beyond a reasonable doubt on every element that con-
stituted the crime.  The Court had carved away that
right, however, so that an “element” of the crime did not
include – nor was a defendant entitled to a jury deter-
mination thereof – every factor that increased his or her
sentence.
In a groundbreaking case, the Court in Apprendi
v. New Jersey,18 opened the door to a broader Sixth
Amendment right than McMillan suggested.  In Ap-
prendi, the defendant was charged under state law with
criminal possession of a firearm, which carried with it a
prison sentence of up to ten years.  After pleading guilty,
the trial court determined by a preponderance of the ev-
idence, that Apprendi violated the state’s hate crime
statute.  Apprendi was sentenced to twelve years based
on this finding – a sentence two years in excess of the
statutory maximum.  On appeal, the state defended Ap-
prendi’s sentence, arguing that the state hate crime
statute was merely a permissible “sentence enhance-
ment” similar to the enhancement upheld in McMillan.
The Court disagreed, noting that “[a]s a matter of simple
justice, it seems obvious that the procedural safeguards
designed to protect Apprendi from unwarranted pains
should apply equally to the two acts that New Jersey has
singled out for punishment.  Merely using the label ‘sen-
tence enhancement’ to describe the latter surely does not
provide a principled basis for treating them differ-
ently.”19 The Court noted that Apprendi was “indis-
putably” entitled to “a jury determination that he is
guilty of every element of the crime with which he is
charged, beyond a reasonable doubt.”20 And then, as if
to reiterate the point, the Court stated that “[e]qually
well founded is the companion right to have the jury ver-
dict based on proof beyond a reasonable doubt.”21 The
Court went on to trace the history of criminal jury trials
and admitted that it “coined” the term “sentencing fac-
tor” in its McMillan decision, creating a species of crim-
inal law facts that were not determined by a jury but
could nevertheless “affect the sentence imposed by the
judge.”22 The Court concluded that based on its own de-
cisions and the history of criminal law in the United
States “[o]ther than the fact of a prior conviction, any
fact that increases the penalty for a crime beyond the
prescribed statutory maximum must be submitted to a
jury, and proved beyond a reasonable doubt.”23 “It is
unconstitutional for a legislature to remove from the jury
the assessment of facts that increase the prescribed range
of penalties to which a criminal defendant is exposed.
It is equally clear that such facts must be established be-
yond a reasonable doubt.”24
The Court seemed untroubled that its ruling
could be considered overruling Walton, in which the de-
fendant’s sentence was set at life in prison and, but for
the trial court’s factual findings, could not be increased
to a sentence of death.  The Court rejected this concern,
stating that “once a jury has found the defendant guilty
of all the elements of an offense for which carries as its
maximum penalty the sentence of death, it may be left
to the judge to decide whether that maximum penalty,
rather than a lesser one, ought to be imposed.”25 The
Court, with Apprendi, expanded the right to a jury trial
but carved out an exception for capital cases in which
judges could determine the facts necessary to impose a
sentence of death.
It only took two years for the Court to overturn
that exception, however.  In Ring v. Arizona (2002),26
the Court again considered the Arizona capital sentenc-
ing scheme it had previously upheld in Walton:  “Capital
defendants, no less than noncapital defendants, we con-
clude, are entitled to a jury determination of any fact on
which the legislature conditions an increase in their
maximum punishment.”27 Contrasting its holding in Ap-
prendi, the Court stated that “[t]he right to trial by jury
guaranteed by the Sixth Amendment would be sense-
lessly diminished if it encompassed the factfinding nec-
essary to increase a defendant’s sentence by two years,
but not the fact-finding necessary to put him to death.”28
The Court held that “to the extent [a capital sentencing
scheme] allows a sentencing judge, sitting without a
jury, to find an aggravating circumstance necessary for
imposition of the death penalty,” that scheme is uncon-
stitutional.29
For our purposes here, Ring marks the state-of-
the-art Sixth Amendment jurisprudence concerning cap-
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ital defendants.  However, two recent decisions show
how the Court is continuing to expand the right to a jury
in non-capital cases.  In Blakeley v. Washington,30 the
Court considered the meaning of “statutory maximum”
as it applies to Sixth Amendment jurisprudence.  At
issue was a state law that allowed a sentencing judge to
depart from the standard sen-
tencing range if the judge found
the defendant acted with “delib-
erate cruelty.”31 The Court held
that “the “statutory maximum
for Apprendi purposes is the
maximum sentence a judge may
impose solely on the basis of
facts reflected in the jury verdict
or admitted by the defendant . .
. .  In other words, the relevant
‘statutory maximum’ is not the
maximum sentence a judge may
impose after finding additional
facts, but the maximum he may
impose without any additional
finding.”32 The Court’s opinion
was not remarkable because it
broke with the Apprendi ruling,
but rather because it called into
question the federal sentencing
guidelines, which look a lot like
the state sentencing scheme
overturned by the Court.  As if
on cue, the Court examined the
federal sentencing guidelines in
United States v. Booker
(2005).33 In Booker, the Court fell short of invalidating
the federal sentencing guidelines but did confirm that
the guidelines were also subject to the requirements of
the Sixth Amendment as stated in Apprendi.34 The
Blakely and Booker decisions merely confirm that the
Court is intent on expanding the right to a jury trial.
This brief overview of the Court’s recent Sixth
Amendment jurisprudence demonstrates that the right
to a jury trial has expanded considerably since In re Win-
ship.  As it stands now, the right to a jury trial means, at
least, that: 
- The defendant is entilted to a jury determina-
tion of each and every element of the crime;
- The jury must be convinced beyond a reason-
able doubt about each and every element;
- Despite a flirtation with “sentencing consider-
ations,” any fact that increases a defendant’s sentence
must be determined by a jury beyond a reasonable
doubt, and 
- Capital defendants, no less than other criminal
defendants, are entilted to all the protections of the Sixth
Amendment. This expansion in the meaning of the Sixth
Amendment is encouraging for proponents of robust de-
fendant rights.  It removes factual de-
terminations that can determine the
fate of the criminal defendant from
the hands of the government (in these
cases judges).  But for any right to be
meaningful, it must be accompanied
by corresponding obligations that are
fulfilled by appropriate actors.  For
the capital defendant to have a mean-
ingful right to a jury trial, it is incum-
bent upon the legal system to ensure
that, among other things: the jury is
adequately informed of the appropri-
ate law; there are adequate safeguards
in place to ensure that a misinformed
jury is properly corrected; and the se-
lected jury is free from bias or preju-
dice.
It would seem that in matters as
weighty as capital jury deliberations,
the Court would vigorously strive to
ensure that jurors understand their in-
structions – instructions that are com-
plex and replete with legalese.
Knowing what we know about jurors (especially capital
jurors) and the instructions they are required to follow,
the criminal justice system should demonstrate both an
awareness that jurors frequently will not understand
those instructions 35 and a willingness to redress misun-
derstandings as they arise.
Instead, the law in this area is based on a pre-
sumption that jurors understand and follow their instruc-
tions.36 As the Court emphatically stated, “we adhere to
the crucial assumption underlying our constitutional sys-
tem of trial by jury that jurors carefully follow instruc-
tions.”37 Of course, a weak presumption (or
assumption38) that jurors understand their instructions
would serve this purpose well.  Capital trials would op-
erate effectively if it were assumed that jurors under-
stand and follow their instructions absent evidence to
the contrary. But, it does not work that way.  Rather,
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For the capital defen-
dant to have a mean-
ingful right to a jury
trial, it is incumbent
upon the legal system
to ensure that, among
other things: the jury is
adequately informed
of the appropriate law;
there are adequate
safeguards in place to
ensure that a misin-
formed jury is properly
corrected; and the se-
lected jury is free from
bias or prejudice.
JuRoR misundeRsTAnding
the presumption that jurors understand their instructions
is used to buttress against attacks on death sentences and
other criminal convictions.  The blind allegiance to the
presumption that jurors understand their instructions is
so overwhelming that it has nearly morphed into a stan-
dard whereby appellate courts look the other way de-
spite overwhelming evidence that jurors fail to
comprehend their instructions.
As a threshold matter, it would seem that if a de-
fendant raises the possibility that the jury instructions
are subject to competing interpretations, one of which
would result in unconstitutional considerations, a re-
viewing court should first look at the instruction itself
for the claimed ambiguity.  If the instruction is subject
to at least one unconstitutional interpretation, it is prob-
ably not possible to determine whether the jury applied
the correct interpretation – after all, appellate judges
cannot step inside the minds of jurors.  Instead, follow-
ing a developing line of argument first introduced in dis-
sent then later marshaled for the majority, Rehnquist has
successfully advanced the notion that the possibility of
unconstitutional interpretation need not impinge on the
Court’s confidence in producing a just verdict.
Thus, even when the jury questions a judge on
an ambiguous instruction and receives an ambiguous re-
sponse, that jury is, in the words of Rehnquist, “pre-
sumed both to follow its instructions and to understand
a judge’s answer to its question.”39 As Scalia admits, the
presumption is closer to an article of faith than a demon-
strable truth: “The rule that juries are presumed to fol-
low their instructions is a pragmatic one, rooted less in
the absolute certitude that the presumption is true than
in the belief that it represents a reasonable practical ac-
commodation of the interests of the state and the defen-
dant in the criminal justice process.”40
But does available evidence support the position
that jurors understand and follow their instructions?  It
does not.  The list of studies demonstrating the inability
of typical citizens to process, much less faithfully act
upon, jury instructions is capacious.41 Social science ev-
idence suggests that misunderstood instructions do not
merely confuse juries, they tend to tilt the process in the
prosecution’s favor.  
While any legal process built upon a foundation
of misunderstanding is intolerable, both legally and log-
ically, the weakness of juror instructions is also a logis-
tical impediment to the functioning of our courts.  For
example, a comprehensive study of the legal fates of
capital defendants found that fully 20% of death sen-
tence reversals are based on unconstitutional jury in-
structions.42
Two areas of capital sentencing instructions that
have proved particularly fertile for producing challenges
based on potential juror misunderstanding are mitigation
instructions and definition of sentence instructions.
Mitigation
When a divided Court permitted the re-imple-
mentation of the death penalty in Gregg v. Georgia
(1976),43 only four years after a similarly divided Court
had effectively suspended the death penalty in Furman
v. Georgia,44 justices sought to establish boundaries for
its use.   The death penalty, the Court ruled, may only
be imposed if it is “directed and limited so as to mini-
mize the risk of wholly arbitrary and capricious ac-
tion.”45
In Gregg, and a series of subsequent cases, the
Court established the value of a bifurcated trial process.
Typically, a single jury in a capital case would, in effect,
sit through two trials, deliberate twice, and reach two
verdicts.  In the first, as in any non-capital trial, the jury
would hear evidence and render a verdict on guilt.  If
the defendant were found guilty of a capital crime, the
jury then would hear evidence relating to the nature of
the crime and the nature of the defendant and render a
verdict on the appropriate sentence.
In the sentencing phase of the trial, the prosecu-
tion seeks to establish aggravating evidence – typically
relating to the heinousness of the crime and the deprav-
ity of the defendant.  The defense is entitled to rebut
those claims, and is also entitled to introduce evidence
relating to any aspect of the defendant’s character or
background that might mitigate the defendant’s actions
and suggest a sentence short of death.46 The Court has
ruled that mitigating evidence is not subject to a “be-
yond a reasonable doubt” standard, and can result in a
verdict rejecting the death sentence based on juror
agreement that mitigation exists, even if jurors do not
unanimously agree on specific mitigating factors.47
Despite the gravity of a death sentence deliber-
ation, and the centrality of weighing aggravating and
mitigating evidence to that process, numerous academic
studies suggest that jurors are ill-equipped or disinclined
to adequately consider mitigating evidence.48 In short,
many jurors do not understand the instructions they are
given by the courts that are supposed to guide their de-
liberations and verdict.  The consequences of misunder-
standing are considerable.  “If the jury does not
understand how the law requires it to establish, weigh,
and balance aggravation and mitigation,” Wiener and
colleagues argue, “then it may well be requiring the de-
73Criminal Law Brief
74 Winter 2009
fendant to forfeit his or her life without the benefit of
due process of law.”49
To test juror understanding of the death sentenc-
ing and deliberation process, one study used members
of the jury pool in Columbus, Ohio who were awaiting
assignment to a case.50 The researchers showed those
jurors a video summarizing a capital case, followed by
the actual instructions read by a judge.51 After a period
of deliberation, jurors were given a multiple-choice test
to measure their understanding of their duties.52 The
questions most frequently answered incorrectly in-
volved the concept of mitigation.53 The questions most
frequently answered correctly involved the concept of
aggravation.54
Another study used a similar method with jury
eligible citizens in the St. Louis area.55 After supplying
the typical instructions offered by Missouri courts in
capital cases, they found only a 50% rate of understand-
ing for mitigation concepts.56
When a 1994 study provided California juror in-
structions to a college student sample, they also found
fewer than half could explain mitigation.57 More alarm-
ingly, one-fourth of the subjects thought a mitigating
factor (such as mental illness) was a basis for supporting
a death sentence.58
While these studies employ a variety of proxy
groups to substitute for actual deliberating capital juries,
there is little doubt that the patterns unearthed apply in
the jury room.  Indeed, surveys of former capital jurors
confirm confusion regarding mitigating factors and a
willingness to see mitigating evidence as irrelevant.59
One capital juror summed up the mitigating evidence
presented in the sentencing proceeding: “It was interest-
ing, but it had no bearing on the case…his whole life
boils down to this once incident.60
Beyond discounting mitigating evidence, re-
search suggests the application and weighing of mitigat-
ing factors can be dependent on personal biases.  One
survey of former capital jurors found that contrary to the
laws and their sworn duty, jurors were less apt to value
mitigating evidence if they felt empathy for the victim.61
Empathy, in turn, was affected by factors including the
race of the victim. 
One could summarize the situation by noting
that “existing literature converges on a serious challenge
to the assumption that reasonable individuals understand
jury instructions,” and therefore, “courts should be cau-
tious in concluding that reasonable people understand
mitigation and aggravation as presented in pattern in-
structions.”62 In fact, contrary to all applicable laws, the
typical juror enters the sentencing proceeding with a
“presumption of death.”63 Instead of alleviating that
legal misconception, court instructions often exacerbate
it by leaving jurors confused.  
Of course, the significance of juror understand-
ing of capital instructions and the nature of aggravating
and mitigating circumstances is only amplified by the
expansion of the jurors’ role in capital sentencing.  In-
deed, as some point out: “[t]he logic followed in Ring
highlights the importance that the Court assigns to the
way in which judges and jurors use aggravating and mit-
igating circumstances to reach penalty decisions.”64
Given the increasing centrality of jurors in the
capital sentencing process, and the strong academic ev-
idence of juror confusion regarding sentencing generally
and mitigation specifically, it is not surprising that a
number of cases have advanced to the Supreme Court
for review hinging on the role and definition of mitiga-
tion, for example: Franklin v. Lynaugh 65; Buchanan v.
Angelone66; Boyde v. California67; and Weeks v. An-
gelone.68 In one aggravation case Francis v. Franklin,69
Rehnquist found himself advancing an argument that
pertinent instructions need not be clarified, amplified,
defined, or sometimes even mentioned.70 In the four
cases Scalia participated in, and in the two Thomas took
part in, they shared Rehnquist’s conclusion.  More to the
point, over time, the conservatives’ perspective on cap-
ital jury instructions has become the Court’s perspec-
tive.
The capital prosecution of Raymond Franklin
hinged on the defendant’s intent.  To win a jury verdict
of malicious murder in Georgia, and to pursue a death
sentence, prosecutors had to prove Franklin intended to
kill his victim.
Franklin was imprisoned for a non-capital of-
fense when he was taken, shackled and guarded, to a
civilian dentist.71 Temporarily unshackled while in the
dentist’s office, Franklin was able to take an officer’s
gun and alight with a hostage from the dental office.72
Franklin made several unsuccessful efforts to steal a
car.73 Franklin and the hostage eventually walked to a
nearby home where Franklin knocked on the door and
demanded the resident’s car keys.74 The resident
slammed the door, after which Franklin fired the gun
twice.75 Both shots went through the door; the first
killed the homeowner, the second lodged in the home’s
ceiling.76
Franklin’s entire defense was lack of intent.77
He claimed that the shooting was not intentional, point-
ing to the fact that neither the people he encountered on
the street nor his hostage were harmed.78 The fact that
the second shot went into the ceiling, Franklin claimed,
was evidence that he was not attempting to kill the vic-
tim.79
The aggravation instructions given to the jury
addressed the issue of intent.80 One hour into their guilt
phase deliberations the jury asked for further instruc-
tions on the issue of intent and the definition of acci-
dent.81 After hearing the original instructions repeated
the jury deliberated for ten additional minutes before re-
turning a guilty verdict.82 Franklin was sentenced to
death the next day.83
Franklin’s attorneys ar-
gued that the jury instructions in-
verted the burden of proving
intent and placed that burden on
the defense, and Justice Brennan,
writing for a five to four majority,
agreed; he wrote that the instruc-
tion on intent “violate[d] the
Fourteenth Amendment’s re-
quirement that the State prove
every element of a criminal of-
fense beyond a reasonable
doubt.”84 The instruction created
a “mandatory presumption”
where proving the act (firing the
gun) in effect established the in-
tent and that “a reasonable juror” would understand the
instructions to shift “to the respondent the burden of per-
suasion on the element of intent once the State had
proved the predicate acts.”85
The Court emphasized the phrase “may be re-
butted” implied that it was the defendant’s burden to es-
tablish that an intent “inference was unwarranted.”86
Separately, the instructions did note, “criminal intention
may not be presumed.”87 But Brennan concluded that
the language “merely contradicts” but does not “ab-
solve” the instruction’s infirmity.88 Indeed, he noted, “a
reviewing court has no way of knowing which of the
two irreconcilable instructions the jurors applied in
reaching their verdicts.”89
Rehnquist’s dissent was incredulous, stating,
“today the Court sets aside Franklin’s murder convic-
tion…because this Court concludes that one or two sen-
tences out of several pages of instructions given by the
judge” lowered the state’s burden of proof.90 Indeed,
later in his dissent Rehnquist explicitly stated: “due
process is not violated in every case where an isolated
sentence implicates constitutional problems.”91 To
Rehnquist, it would appear, the standard for an uncon-
stitutional instruction must demonstrate it to be not only
unconstitutional but also verbose. 
In fact, Rehnquist conceded that a “technical
analysis of the charge…from a legal standpoint” would
support the Court’s conclusion that the instructions were
misleading.92 However, no “reasonable juror” could
have read the instructions closely enough to form the
misimpression the Court posits.93 Indeed, Rehnquist
suggested “the Court is attributing qualities to the aver-
age juror that are found in very few lawyers.”94
Brennan took suspicious note of Rehnquist’s
conclusion that jurors would not
have paid enough attention to the
instructions to be affected by the
contradiction.   In a previous case,
Parker v. Randolph, in which the
prosecution’s argument hinged on
close juror attention to the instruc-
tions, Rehnquist was burdened by
no doubts regarding juror rigor.
Rehnquist wrote for the Court,
“[a] crucial assumption underlying
[trial by jury] is that juries will fol-
low the instructions given them by
the trial judge.  Were this not so, it
would be pointless for a trial court
to instruct a jury, and even more
pointless for an appellate court to reverse a criminal con-
viction because the jury was improperly instructed.”95
Thus, Brennan chides, “[a]pparently [Rehnquist] would
have the degree of attention a juror is presumed to pay
to particular jury instructions vary with whether a pre-
sumption of attentiveness would help or harm the crim-
inal defendant.”96
Instead of burdening the defense with disproving
intent, Rehnquist concluded the typical juror would have
approached the situation far differently.  Rehnquist
wrote: “[t]he reasonable interpretation of the challenged
charge is that…the presumption could be rebutted by
the circumstances surrounding the acts, whether pre-
sented by the State or the defendant.”97 In other words,
Rehnquist did not find the burden of disproving intent
to be placed on the defense because at any given mo-
ment the prosecution could switch sides and attempt to
present a case disproving intent.  
While the minority in this case, Rehnquist’s un-
derlying conclusion, that the Court must raise the bar
for defendants to demonstrate faulty instructions, would
ultimately take hold and be applied in mitigation instruc-
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Rehnquist did not find
the burden of disprov-
ing intent to be placed
on the defense because
at any given moment
the prosecution could
switch sides and at-
tempt to present a case
disproving intent.  
tion cases.  As he suggested in his dissent, “it must at
least be likely” rather than a reasonable possibility that
instructions led jurors to misapply the law before the
Court should intervene.98
As Brennan noted, such a standard would leave
the Court an “impressionistic and intuitive” task to deign
what path jurors followed in cases such as Francis v.
Franklin when the instructions contained a contradic-
tion.99 This is despite what Brennan called a settled
precedent that verdicts must be set aside when there is
a reasonable possibility that jurors based their verdict
on an unconstitutional understanding of law .100
In a Texas capital case, Franklin v. Lynaugh101
the sentencing jury was instructed to return a death sen-
tence if they found two specific aggravating factors: that
the murder was deliberate and that the defendant repre-
sented a continuing threat.102 The instructions made no
mention of the concept of mitigation.103
The issue before the Court was whether the in-
structions afforded the defendant an adequate opportu-
nity to have mitigating evidence weighed by the jury in
its sentencing deliberations.104 In a decision written by
Justice White, and joined by Chief Justice Rehnquist
and Justice Scalia, a plurality of the Court found the in-
structions adequate.105 Justice White noted that the
judge’s instructions told the jury to base their verdict
“on all the evidence.”106 Thus, even though mitigation
was never mentioned, that general instruction carried
with it the obligation to weigh mitigating evidence.
The entirety of the defense’s mitigation presen-
tation was Franklin’s prison record, which revealed that
he was not a violent inmate.107 “We are thus quite sure
that the jury’s consideration of petitioner’s prison record
was not improperly limited,” White wrote, because the
jury was “free to weigh and evaluate” that record.108
In reality, though, the standard advanced by
White and the plurality was not based on any demon-
strable indication that the jury did weigh the mitigating
evidence, but rather by their conclusion that weighing
such evidence was possible.  White wrote, “[w]e do not
believe that the jury instructions or the Texas Special Is-
sues precluded jury consideration of any relevant miti-
gating circumstances in this case.”109
Given the Texas instructions, Stevens’ dissent
questioned how a defendant, with a clearly established
right to present mitigating evidence reflecting upon any
factor relevant to his life, could possibly have that evi-
dence be properly weighed when the jury entered delib-
erations with only two questions before them.110 “A
sentencing jury must be given the authority to reject im-
position of the death penalty on the basis of any evi-
dence relevant to the defendant’s character or record or
the circumstances of the offense proffered by the defen-
dant in support of a sentence less than death.  That rule
does not merely require that the jury be allowed to hear
any such evidence the defendant desires to introduce, it
also requires that the jury be allowed to give ‘indepen-
dent mitigating weight’ to the evidence.”111
Stevens argued that by not offering an instruc-
tion on the application of mitigation, the judge had, in
effect, told the jury to ignore such evidence. “The failure
to give such an instruction removed that evidence from
the sentencer’s consideration just as effectively as would
have an instruction informing the jury that petitioner’s
character was irrelevant to its sentencing decision.”112
In fact, in her concurring opinion, O’Connor admitted
that the implied legal relevance of mitigation seems lim-
ited only to direct responses to the aggravating factors.113
Ten years later the Virginia Court considered a
very similar case.  In Buchanan v. Angelone, the judge
presented capital sentencing instructions to the jury
without mention of mitigation.114 Instead, the judge in-
structed the jury to weigh whether the crime was “out-
rageously or wantonly vile, horrible or inhuman.”115 If
they agreed it was, the jury would then deliberate on
whether a death sentence was appropriate.  Again, the
judge instructed jurors to consider “all the evidence.”116
As in Franklin v. Lynaugh, the defense unsuc-
cessfully sought a set of instructions explaining mitiga-
tion.117 Further the defense asked that jurors be
instructed that if they found the factor to mitigate against
the death penalty then they “shall consider that fact in
deciding whether to impose a sentence of death or life
imprisonment.”118
In a six to three decision, the Court again found
that lack of instructions on the concept of mitigation and
mitigating factors does not violate due process or cruel
and unusual punishment.119 Writing for the Court, Chief
Justice Rehnquist emphasized that while any death sen-
tence deliberation must be a “broad inquiry into all rel-
evant mitigating evidence,” there is no “particular way”
juries should consider such evidence.120 Adhering to the
Franklin v. Lynaugh plurality, Rehnquist here noted that
the jury was told to “base its decision on ‘all the evi-
dence,’” thus affording “jurors an opportunity to con-
sider mitigating evidence.”121
Rehnquist argued that the amount of mitigating
evidence presented to the jury indicates that the jury
gave weight to that evidence.  That is, because the jury
heard two days of testimony on defendant’s background
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and mental problems, “it is not likely that the jury would
disregard this extensive testimony in making its deci-
sion, particularly given the instruction to consider ‘all
the evidence.’”122 Of course, Rehnquist came to the
same conclusion when the jury was presented with al-
most no mitigating evidence in Franklin v. Lynaugh.123
One fundamental fact here and in related cases
is that the Court’s certainty regarding juror understand-
ing does not rely on direct evidence.  That is, no one
bothered to ask the jurors if they understood the instruc-
tions to ensure that the mitigating evidence was properly
considered.  No one bothered to test these instructions
to see if ordinary laypersons could understand them.  
Meanwhile, in a concurring opinion, Scalia
agreed that juror instructions need not explain mitiga-
tion.  He offered this conclusion not because the rele-
vance of mitigation is obvious in its presentation, or
established inside the phrase “all the evidence,” but
rather because juries need not “be given discretion to
consider mitigating evidence.”124 Indeed, Scalia found
fault not only with mitigation, but also with the entire
bifurcated process; “drawing an arbitrary line in the sand
between the ‘eligibility and selection phases’ of the sen-
tencing decision is, in [his] view, incoherent and ulti-
mately doomed to failure.”125
In the dissent, as in Franklin v. Lynaugh, Breyer
argued that since the only question put to jurors involved
aggravating circumstances, jurors would reasonably
apply mitigating information only to the extent it di-
rectly helped them decide upon the aggravating evi-
dence.  Breyer questioned how jurors were to
operationalize the mitigating evidence, noting that the
jury instructions at issue “tell the jury that evidence of
mitigating circumstances (concerning, say, the defen-
dant’s childhood and his troubled relationships with the
victims) is not relevant to their sentencing decision.”126
Unless the jury was “made up of experienced
death penalty lawyers …parsing the instructions in a
highly complicated, technical way that they alone are
likely to understand” then “a natural reading of the lan-
guage” would seem to foreclose the application of mit-
igation.127 Breyer made a rather simple suggestion for
changing the instructions: “mention of mitigating evi-
dence anywhere in the instructions” would clear things
up.128
In directly competing interpretations, Rehnquist
and Breyer attempt to show how each other’s conclusion
is a “strained parsing” of the instruction.129 They debate,
among other matters, the relative weight of the instruc-
tion’s use of the words “if” and “or.” It is an amusing
colloquy between two jurists quibbling over language –
at least it would be if a person’s life did not hang in the
balance.130
What the exchange proves, however, is that one
judge with the aid of a team of law clerks does not in-
terpret a jury instruction the same way as another – and
his own team of law clerks – does.  If justices on the
Court cannot agree on an interpretation, how can layper-
sons with no legal training be presumed to do so?
California’s capital instructions in place at the
time Richard Boyde was tried did mention mitigation.131
The instructions featured eleven factors – lettered a
through k – the jury should consider before deciding
upon a sentence: the first eight factors essentially estab-
lished possible aggravating circumstances, and the ninth
and tenth factors established two specific forms of mit-
igating circumstances, neither of which applied to
Boyde.132 The eleventh – factor k, as it was referred to
– instructed the jury to consider “any other circumstance
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though
it is not a legal excuse for the crime.”133 After deciding
upon the factors, the jury was told to determine if the
aggravating circumstances outweighed the mitigating
circumstances, and if so, then “you shall impose a sen-
tence of death.” 134
The issue before the Court was whether the
wording of the mitigation instruction narrowly focused
the jury’s attention on the crime, thus undermining the
value of the mitigation evidence regarding Boyde’s per-
sonal background and troubled childhood that was the
focus of his defense.135 Boyde also argued that the “shall
impose” language created a limit on juror discretion to
support a life sentence regardless of the aggravation/mit-
igation equation.136
In a five to four decision written by Rehnquist
and joined by Scalia the Court upheld the instructions.137
Rehnquist admitted the instructions could be considered
“ambiguous.”138 But as was the case in Buchanan v. An-
gelone, he argued that surely the presentation of miti-
gating evidence implied its relevance.139 Further, the
jury was free to consider any information and decide
that it somehow applied “to the crime.”140
Thus, Rehnquist concluded that the jury’s inter-
pretation of the instructions as limiting their attention to
information directly relevant to the crime was “only a
possibility.”141 Instead, building on his dissent in Fran-
cis v. Franklin, Rehnquist argued that the Court needed
to be concerned about instructions only when there is a
“reasonable likelihood that the jury as a whole applied
instructions as the defendant asserted.”142 “Finality and
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accuracy,” Rehnquist wrote, are better established by a
focus on the likely conclusions of the entire jury rather
than considering “how a single hypothetical ‘reasonable
juror’ could or might have interpreted the instruction.”143
This evolving standard for juror confusion con-
tinues to have tremendous implications.  In previous
cases, including Francis v. Franklin, the Court dealt
with instructions that “a reasonable juror” could rely
upon to impose an unconstitutional judgment.144 Here
the Court applies a standard requiring that jury instruc-
tions create a “likelihood that
the jury” has applied an uncon-
stitutional standard. 145
Beyond dismissing the
significance of objections to in-
structions that are potentially
misleading, the Court here
moved to dismiss objections to
instructions which have misled
jurors (providing that some un-
specified ratio of jurors were
not misled).  As Marshall noted
in the dissent, “the majority re-
gards confidence” that individ-
ual jurors understood the
instructions “as unnecessary to
its affirmance of Boyde’s death
sentence.”146 Marshall argued
that such a stance “reflects the
Court’s growing and unjustified
hostility to claims of constitu-
tional violation by capital de-
fendants.”147
Apart from arguing that it is acceptable for some
jurors to act based on an unconstitutional standard,
Rehnquist essentially sent the Court down the very dif-
ficult path of determining precisely what percentage of
a jury was misled by an instruction.  How the court is to
determine this percentage is not spelled out.148 Ironi-
cally, given he has created a standard based on guess-
work, Rehnquist then mocked the defense claim of juror
confusion because it “amounts to no more than specu-
lation.”149
Part of the distinction Rehnquist made between
juror confusion and jury confusion was based on the
conclusion that the deliberation process allows juries to
rise above confusing instructions because the group will
ultimately arrive at a “commonsense understanding of
the instructions.”150 By contrast, academic research
shows the deliberation process is by no means a place
where misconceptions go to die, but rather a forum
where preconceived notions and faulty instructions can
wreak havoc with legal process.151
Indeed, Rehnquist cited no evidence that would
suggest “commonsense” understandings would prevail;
more importantly, he fails to mention exactly what a
commonsense understanding of the instructions might
look like.  As is readily apparent from the instruction,
the language, syntax, and structure are not what layper-
sons generally encounter, so it is hard to understand how
they might have come to a
“commonsense” interpretation.
In the dissent, Marshall
lamented the lowering of the bar
for instructions (or the raising of
the bar for challenges to them).
Indeed, Marshall suggested the
Court had created an ambiguous
standard in reviewing ambigu-
ous instructions, which can only
result in “confusion.”152
Given that the only rele-
vant mitigation instruction “un-
ambiguously refers to
circumstances related to the
crime”153 Marshall questioned
how the majority could be con-
vinced that the jury gave weight
to mitigating evidence that was
outside “the plain meaning of
the factor’s language.”154 Peo-
ple do not view “the seriousness
of a crime as dependent upon
the background and character of the offender.  A typical
juror would not, for example, describe a particular mur-
der as ‘a less serious crime’ because of the redeeming
qualities of the murderer.”155
For Marshall, “when we tolerate the possibility
of error in capital proceedings and leave people in
doubt,” we step toward the death penalty process the
Court had found “discriminatory” and “intolerable” in
Furman v. Georgia.156
Instead of the obvious course of action – con-
fronting head-on the ambiguity of the instructions and
conceding that a layperson could easily produce an un-
constitutional application of those instructions – Rehn-
quist chose to instead speculate about whether it was
likely that the jury interpreted the instructions unconsti-
tutionally.157 This does not seem to be a jurisprudence
aimed at ensuring a meaningful right to a jury but,
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seriousness of a crime as
dependent upon the
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ter of the offender.  A
typical juror would not,
for example, describe a
particular murder as ‘a
less serious crime’ be-
cause of the redeeming
qualities of the mur-
derer.” - Chief Justice
Marshall
rather, a jurisprudence of protecting the legal system
from legitimate questions.  In addition, as the dissent
noted, “[i]t is an essential corollary of our reasonable-
doubt standard in criminal proceedings that a convic-
tion, capital or otherwise, cannot stand if the jury’s
verdict could have rested on unconstitutional
grounds.”158
The fact that Rehnquist, in establishing the “rea-
sonable likelihood” standard, is more worried about pro-
tecting the system against attack rather than supporting
a meaningful right to a jury is confirmed when he wrote
about two “strong policies” of the Court: one in favor
of “accurate determination of the appropriate sentence
in a capital case” and the other, which he wrote is
“equally strong”, “against retrials years after the first
trial where the claimed error amounts to no more than
speculation.”159 Rehnquist’s commentary on the Court’s
two “equally strong” policies begs the question:  when
the two policies conflict, which one wins?  Rehnquist
found getting it over with more persuasive than ensuring
that the capital defendant receives a meaningful right to
a jury trial.
Despite the Court’s support for its instructions,
state legislators in California ultimately rewrote the mit-
igation language in their statute.  Beyond the original
language of factor k referring to “any other circumstance
which extenuates the gravity of the crime even though
it is not a legal excuse for the crime,” the new instruc-
tions included the requirement that jurors note “any
sympathetic or other aspect of the defendant’s character
or record . . . whether or not related to the offense for
which he is on trial.”160
In many respects a perfect culmination of this
line of controversy occurred in Weeks v. Angelone.161
Again the issue centered on how to consider mitigation.
On this occasion, however, there was no need to specu-
late on whether “a reasonable juror” was confused, or if
there was a “reasonable likelihood” the jury was con-
fused, because the jury announced that it was con-
fused.162
The defendant, Lonnie Weeks in the case con-
fessed the day after the crime to killing a police offi-
cer.163 Arrested the day after the crime, Lonnie Weeks
quickly confessed and expressed remorse.164 Weeks ar-
ticulated the desire to commit suicide because of his ac-
tions.165
The judge informed the jury that if they found
aggravation “then you may fix the punishment at death,
or if you believe from all the evidence that the death
penalty is not justified, then you shall fix the punishment
at life imprisonment.”166
After four hours of deliberation, the jury asked
whether their deliberation was complete if it did find ag-
gravation, or if it then still had to weigh whether a death
sentence was appropriate:
If we believe that Lonnie Weeks, Jr. is
guilty of at least 1 of the [aggravating
factors], then is it our duty as a jury to
issue the death penalty?  Or must we de-
cide . . . whether or not to issue the death
penalty, or one of the life sentences?
What is the rule?  Please clarify?167
The defense asked the judge to instruct the jury
that even if they found aggravation beyond a reasonable
doubt they could still impose a life sentence.  The judge
declined, instead repeating the original instruction with-
out clarification.  The judge noted, “I don’t believe I can
answer the question any clearer than the instruction.”168
The jury deliberated for two additional hours before re-
turning a death sentence.
In another five to four decision written by Rehn-
quist, joined by Scalia and Thomas, the Court found the
instruction “constitutionally sufficient.”169 Again, the
Court admitted the jury might have fundamentally mis-
understood its charge stating: “there exists a slight pos-
sibility that the jury considered itself precluded from
considering mitigating evidence.”170 However, Rehn-
quist rebutted that fear because “a jury is presumed to
follow its instructions” and “to understand a judge’s an-
swer to its question.”171
Thus, the Court took the position that the jury
must have understood the instruction because the jury
openly asked for help upon receiving nothing more than
the original instruction.
Moreover, Rehnquist advanced what he called
“empirical” evidence of juror understanding; since the
jurors spent more than two hours deliberating after the
judge’s answer, they must have understood its mean-
ing.172
Presumably, if the jury had returned almost im-
mediately after the instruction Rehnquist would have
seen that as evidence that the Jury had clearly under-
stood the instruction because they were able to act so
swiftly.  This is no mere speculation, as ten minutes of
deliberation following a jury question in Francis v.
Franklin was considered to be evidence of juror under-
standing in Rehnquist’s dissent in that case.173 Here,
staying out two additional hours was evidence of under-
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standing.  It is interesting to consider what length of time
Rehnquist would possibly have seen as an indication of
misunderstanding.  Indeed, it seems more likely that
Rehnquist has constructed an unfalsifiable standard
where brevity of deliberations suggests easily under-
stood standards and prolonged deliberations establish
seriously undertaken discussion of evidence, but no
length of deliberations implies misunderstanding of in-
structions. 
The majority further took as evidence of under-
standing the fact that the jury “did not inform the court
that after reading the relevant paragraph of instruction,
it still did not understand its role.”174 Indeed, Rehnquist
concluded, “This particular jury demonstrated that it
was not too shy to ask questions, suggesting that it
would have asked another if it felt the judge’s response
unsatisfactory.”175 In other words, after the jury directly
asked for clarification it did not receive, the Court takes
the jury’s lack of inclination to ask the exact same ques-
tion again as evidence of understanding, though repeat-
ing the question would logically have resulted in the
same non-answer.176
Stevens asked in his dissent, “if the jurors found
it necessary to ask the judge what that paragraph meant
in the first place, why should we presume that they
would find it any less ambiguous just because the judge
told them to read it again?”177 Moreover, he questioned
attaching any significance to the jury’s failure to repeat
the question: “It seems to me far more likely that the
reason they did not ask the same question a second time
is that the jury believed that it would be disrespectful to
repeat a simple, unambiguous question that the judge
had already refused to answer directly.”178
Similarly intriguing is the notion that the jury’s
question ultimately lends confidence to Rehnquist’s
conclusion that the jury understood its instructions.  If
the jury had never asked a question, it would have been
presumed to understand its instructions.  If, instead, the
jury directly questioned an instruction fundamental to
their duty, expressing complete uncertainty about the
standard they were to apply and including the words,
“What is the rule? Please clarify?” upon which point
they received clarifying information, then the jury is pre-
sumed to understand its instructions.  Even if, as in this
case, the jury posed that same question and received no
new information or clarification of any kind, the jury is
presumed to understand its instructions.  Again, Rehn-
quist has advanced an unfalsifiable standard: not asking
a question is evidence of understanding, and asking a
question is also evidence of understanding.179
Rehnquist’s powers of jury mind reading are not
limited to legal interpretation.  The dissent noted that a
majority of jurors were in tears when the death sentence
was read, an unusual occurrence according to state court
officials.180 This suggests, suggesting to Stevens that
some may have felt that the sentence was inappropriate.
Rehnquist countered that the unusual tears reflected ex-
haustion and a belief that the defendant “deserved the
death sentence.”181 Rehnquist does not elaborate on why
what are presumably elements of nearly every jury death
sentence should produce tears only in this rare instance. 
In the dissent, Stevens made a basic case for
“clarity – clarity in the judge’s instructions when there
is a reasonable likelihood that the jury may misunder-
stand the governing rule of law.”182
Even with the high standard for demonstrating
juror confusion, Stevens argued that “this case estab-
lishes, not just a ‘reasonable likelihood’ of jury confu-
sion, but a virtual certainty that the jury did not realize
that there were two distinct legal bases for concluding
that a death sentence was not ‘justified.’”183 That is, the
jury could find aggravation had not been proved, or if
aggravation had been proved, it could find the death
penalty was not warranted after weighing mitigation.  In
contrast to Rehnquist’s position that the jury’s question
demonstrated understanding, “[t]he fact that the jurors
asked this question about that instruction demonstrates
beyond peradventure that the instruction had confused
them.  There would have been no reason to ask the ques-
tion if they had understood the instruction to authorize
a life sentence even though they found that an aggrava-
tor had been proved.”184
Given that the judge provided the confused jury
no new information, Stevens asked where the majority
found confidence that the jury was “magically satisfied
by the repetition of the instruction that had not hereto-
fore answered its question.”185 Stevens posited that “a
non-lawyer” would have concluded death was the only
available sentence if aggravation had been proved.
There was simply “no reason to believe that the jury un-
derstood the judge’s answer to its question” and there-
fore “overwhelming grounds for reversal.”186
Ultimately, Stevens, like Breyer in the Buchanan dis-
sent, called for the “easy” step of giving the jury a
“straightforward categorical answer to their simple
question.”187
Would Weeks’ have received a death sentence if
the jury had understood its duty to determine both ag-
gravation and, separately, whether the sentence was war-
ranted?  A team of academics took up the question.
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Using jury eligible subjects, researchers created a series
of simulated sentencing deliberations.188 In each, sub-
jects were given information on the case and the instruc-
tions provided by the judge.189 But three different
conditions were created with regard to the question on
whether they needed to deliberate past finding aggrava-
tion.190 The first group was never told of the jury’s ques-
tion in Weeks and asked to deliberate based on the
original instructions.191 The second group was told of
the jury’s question, and, as occurred in the case, was pro-
vided a second reading of the original instructions.192
The third group was told of the jury’s question and pro-
vided a plain language answer that they must deliberate
on the question of whether to
impose death even if they find
aggravation.193
The results were quite
clear.  At least half of the sub-
jects in the first two groups
thought that finding aggrava-
tion ended the need for deliber-
ation and established the
penalty at death.194 Even
among the third group, given a
plain language instruction that
this was not true, one-fourth of
the subjects held the same be-
lief.195 More significantly,
among those who correctly un-
derstood the obligation, a ma-
jority favored a life sentence.196
Regardless of the real-
ity of studies like the one described above, Franklin v.
Lynaugh , Buchanan v. Angelone, Boyde v. California,
Weeks v. Angelone, and Francis v. Franklin establish a
successful effort on the part of Rehnquist, joined by
Scalia and Thomas, to establish two pillars that now un-
dergird the Court’s approach to jury instructions in cap-
ital cases.  First, whether the instructions are clear or
unclear, consistent or contradictory, explicit or unmen-
tioned, jurors can be expected to understand their duties.
Second, even if the Court identifies “one or two sen-
tences”197 of unconstitutional instructions, or find evi-
dence that a “reasonable juror”198 was misled, the
instruction is still tolerable.
defining a sentence
While capital jurors are apt to be confused by in-
structions regarding the sentencing decision, they are
similarly flummoxed by the sentences themselves.
When jurors are asked to decide whether to impose a
death sentence, the alternative typically available to
them is to impose a life sentence.  What “life sentence”
means provokes wildly different interpretations from ju-
rors – and those beliefs are crucial to their sentencing
preferences.  The belief that a “life sentence” is for a pe-
riod of less than life dramatically increases the likeli-
hood that a person will favor imposing a death
sentence.199 Indeed, interviews with former capital case
jurors confirmed that the less time they understood a life
sentence to require the more likely they were to support
a death verdict.200
As was the case with the meaning and import of
mitigation, the definition of a
sentence was discussed in the
case in which the Court
brought the death penalty
back into legal use.  In Gregg
v. Georgia, the Court de-
clared that the Eighth
Amendment demands that ju-
rors are given “accurate sen-
tencing information” because
it is “an indispensable prereq-
uisite to a reasoned determi-
nation of whether a defendant
shall live or die.”201
In the four cases high-
lighted below (California v.
Ramos202; Simmons v. South
Carolina203; Shafer v. South
Carolina204; Kelly v. South
Carolina205), the issue turned on juror understanding of
the sentences they might impose.  In the latter three
cases, Scalia and Thomas dissented and made clear that
they found no need to make plain to the jurors the mean-
ing of the sentence they were considering; Rehnquist
joined their position in the final case.  In the first case,
in which only Rehnquist participated, he joined a ma-
jority advancing the notion that the state may assert life
sentences are something less than life sentences.
In typical criminal trials, jurors must determine
guilt or innocence.  The length or nature of the sentence
a defendant might face if found guilty is legally irrele-
vant to jury proceedings.  Were the jurors to inquire
about punishment, they would be told that punishment
is not for their consideration.
In capital trials, jurors determine not only guilt
or innocence, but they also impose a sentence.  While
telling jurors not to concern themselves with punish-
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At least half of the subjects
in the first two groups
thought that finding aggra-
vation ended the need for
deliberation and established
the penalty at death.  Even
among the third group,
given a plain language in-
struction that this was not
true, one-fourth of the sub-
jects held the same belief.
ment may be a legally sound practice in other cases, in
many jurisdictions it is also the default practice in cap-
ital cases in many jurisdictions.  That is, even though
they are explicitly deciding upon a sentence, in effect
jurors are commonly told not to concern themselves
with the actual meaning of the sentence.206
As such, when they ask if a “life sentence”
means a term of life, or if it is for some shorter period,
or if they ask whether parole is possible, jurors’ ques-
tions often go unanswered.  This despite the fact that
confusion about these terms is widespread, and in some
jurisdictions the meaning of “life sentence” has changed
dramatically in recent years.
In Simmons v. South Carolina, among the rea-
sons the state argued Jonathan Simmons should get the
death penalty was that he posed a future threat.  Execut-
ing Simmons, the prosecutor said, “[would] be an act of
self-defense” for society.207 Jurors deliberating on Sim-
mons’ sentence were asked to choose between death and
a sentence of life imprisonment, and in doing so, the ju-
rors asked if the defendant was eligible for parole.208
The judge not only refused to answer directly, but he
had previously barred the defense from mentioning Sim-
mons parole ineligibility during the proceedings.209
Blackmun wrote for the Court’s plurality that
misunderstanding a “life sentence” created “a false
dilemma” between a death sentence and a sentence to a
“limited period of incarceration.”210 Given that the pros-
ecution argued that the defendant would be a danger to
society, the defendant had a due process right to inform
the jury that a life sentence would result in his impris-
onment for the rest of his life because “in assessing fu-
ture dangerousness, the actual duration of the
defendant’s prison sentence is indisputably relevant.”211
It seems well established that the meaning of a
“life sentence” was not commonly understood in the
state.  The defense presented contemporary polling data
showing only seven percent of jury eligible South Car-
olinians thought a life sentence carried with it a term of
life.212 Nearly half thought a life sentence was twenty
years or less, nearly three in four thought it was thirty
years or less.213
Thus, it was not entirely surprising when, after
90 minutes of deliberation, the jury asked, “Does the im-
position of a life sentence carry with it the possibility of
parole?”214
The judge replied: “You are instructed not to
consider parole or parole eligibility in reaching your ver-
dict.  Do not consider parole or parole eligibility. That
is not a proper issue for your consideration.  The terms
life imprisonment and death sentence are to be under-
stood in their plain and ordinary meaning.”215
Given that ninety-three percent of state residents
did not know what the plain and ordinary meaning of
“life imprisonment” was, the response was less than il-
luminating.216 As Justice Blackmun put it, the jury “was
denied a straight answer about petitioner’s parole eligi-
bility even when it was requested.”217 Indeed, Black-
mun concluded that the judge’s response not only did
not establish the truth about parole, but supported a mis-
conception.  “This instruction actually suggested that
parole was available, but that the jury, for some unstated
reason, should be blind to this fact.  Undoubtedly, the
instruction was confusing and frustrating to the jury.”218
Twenty- five minutes after hearing the judge’s
response, the jury sentenced Simmons to death.219
Justice Scalia, joined by Justice Thomas, offered
a dissent.  Scalia questioned the relevance of the parole
issue and the future dangerousness argument. “I am sure
it was the sheer depravity of those crimes, rather than
any specific fear for the future, which induced the South
Carolina jury to conclude that the death penalty was jus-
tice.”220 It would be “quite farfetched” to think parole
was a significant matter for the jury.221 If that were true,
and parole was very irrelevant, one must wonder why
the prosecution vociferously objected to the jury being
told parole was not available. 
Moreover, why would the jury ask about parole
if its deliberations were not in any way affected by ques-
tions related to when the defendant might gain freedom
and what he might do under those conditions?  Further,
if the future dangerousness of the defendant was irrele-
vant to the jury, why did the prosecution bother making
the argument, and how is Scalia in a better position to
determine the value of the argument to the jury than the
prosecutor who handled the case?
Nevertheless, Scalia asserted that the prosecu-
tor’s claim that executing Simmons will be “an act of
self defense” was irrelevant to the jurors.  “This refer-
ence to ‘self-defense’ obviously alluded neither to de-
fense of the jurors’ own persons, nor specifically to
defense of persons outside the prison walls, but to de-
fense of all members of society against this individual,
wherever he or they might be.”222 How a phrase could
allude to “all members of society” without alluding to
the jurors and other “persons outside prison walls” is
something of a semantic mystery.  
Beyond making the case that the parole issue
was irrelevant, Scalia asserted that there was also a mat-
ter of fundamental fairness here.  “Preventing the de-
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fense from introducing evidence regarding parolability
is only half of the rule that prevents the prosecution from
introducing it as well.”223
Just to be clear, Scalia has argued that not allow-
ing the defense to define the true meaning of a life sen-
tence is fair because the prosecution, were they to switch
sides during the trial in an attempt to aid the defense,
would also be prohibited from defining the life sentence.
This is the companion argument to the assertion that
Rehnquist made in Francis v. Franklin that both the de-
fense and prosecution were free to demonstrate the de-
fendant lacked intent to kill.  Apparently prosecutors
switching sides in the middle of a trial must be fairly
common, although it a phenomenon known only to the
Court’s most conservative members. 224
Ultimately, Scalia’s dissent suggested his objec-
tion was less to the Court’s conclusion than to its larger
implications for executions.  The Court’s standard is a
“reasonable as a matter of policy,” he wrote, but sadly
represents “another front in the guerilla war to make this
unquestionably constitutional sentence a practical im-
possibility.”225
Seven years after Simmons the Court dealt with
nearly the same question in another South Carolina cap-
ital case.  In Shafer v. South Carolina (2001)226 the judge
again provided sentencing instructions without defining
life imprisonment.  Despite the prosecution raising the
specter of future dangerousness, the defense was barred
from explaining to the jury that parole was not a possi-
bility.  The judge also rejected the defense’s request that
the language of the applicable state statute be read to the
jury. [The statute explains that “‘life imprisonment’
means until death of the offender” and that there is no
possibility of parole, furlough, or any type or fashion of
release].
Again, confusion on the meaning of a life sen-
tence ensued.  About three and a half hours into delib-
erations the jury asked the judge: “Is there any remote
chance for someone convicted of murder to become el-
igible for parole?”227 The judge replied: “Parole eligi-
bility or ineligibility is not for your consideration.”228
Eighty minutes later the jury returned with a death sen-
tence.  The defense asked that the jury be polled regard-
ing their understanding of a life sentence, but the judge
refused.
Writing for a seven to two majority, Justice
Ginsburg concluded that the jury lacked “any clear un-
derstanding” of the life sentence they were meant to
weigh against a death sentence.229
In a rather astonishing dissent, Thomas, joined
by Scalia, asserted there was no evidence of juror con-
fusion.  “I believe that the court’s instructions and the
arguments made by counsel in Shafer’s case were suffi-
cient to inform the jury of what ‘life imprisonment’
meant for Shafer”230 and “left no room for speculation
by the jury”231 on meaning of life sentence. 
What, then, did the jury mean to indicate when
it asked about the potential for the defendant to be re-
leased?  “I can only infer that the jury’s questions re-
garding parole referred not to Shafer’s parole eligibility
in the event the jury sentenced Shafer to life, but rather
to his parole eligibility in the event it did not sentence
him at all.”232 In other words, Thomas takes the jury’s
direct question regarding their direct task, and concludes
they meant to inquire not about anything they were
doing but rather wished to clarify a point of law that they
had not raised and which had no bearing on them.
As was the case in Weeks v. Angelone, direct jury
questions on topics which are widely misunderstood are
taken here by Scalia and Thomas to be not so much in-
dicators of confusion, but either indicators of under-
standing or interest in arcane legal points unrelated to
the jurors’ task.
The South Carolina legal system would produce
yet another iteration of this basic controversy one year
later.  In Simmons, and again in Shafer, the Court had
clearly stated a defendant’s right to establish before the
jury that parole was unavailable in response to prosecu-
tion efforts to establish future dangerousness.  In Kelly233
the state claimed, (and the trial judge agreed,) it had
made no effort to establish future dangerousness and
therefore no mention of parole ineligibility was war-
ranted.  
The Court, in a five to four decision, took note
of the prosecutor’s repeated characterizations of the de-
fendant William Kelly.  The prosecutor called Kelly
“Bloody Billy,”234 the “Butcher of Batesburg,”235 and
noted he was “more frightening than a serial killer.”236
The prosecutor warned “murderers will be murderers
and he is there is a cold-blooded one right over there.”237
Souter, writing for the Court, highlighted sev-
eral such examples as well as the overall thrust of the
prosecutor’s presentation and concluded: “the evi-
dence and argument . . . …are flatly at odds with the
view that ‘future dangerousness was not an issue in
this case.’”238
Justice Rehnquist in his dissent disputed the no-
tion that future dangerousness came up in the case.
“The prosecutor did not argue future dangerousness . . .
…in any meaningful sense of that term.”239 Curiously,
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Rehnquist admitted that “the prosecutor’s arguments
about the details of the murder, as well as the violent
episodes in prison, demonstrated petitioner’s evil char-
acter.”240 Thus, as Rehnquist would have it, the prose-
cutor sought and successfully established the
defendant’s credentials for evil status, but somehow ap-
parently implied his evilness had expired and carried no
implications for the future.
Thomas, joined by Scalia, offered a separate dis-
sent, not to dispute whether future dangerousness was
raised in the case, but to reaffirm his position that the
defendant should have no right to reveal parole infor-
mation regardless of prosecution arguments.
While Simmons, Shafer, and Kelly fought over
the state not providing information about life sentences,
California v. Ramos (1983)241
centered on the state giving addi-
tional information about life sen-
tences.  In short, California law
required the judge to inform the
sentencing jury in a capital case
that if they sentenced the defen-
dant to life imprisonment the
state’s governor could commute
the sentence to a shorter term.
Ramos’ attorney argued
such an instruction invited the
jury to speculate, and was biased
against the defendant because
there was no mention of the fact
that the governor had the same
power to commute a death sen-
tence. 
In a five to four decision,
the Court found the instruction
permissible.  O’Connor wrote for a majority which in-
cluded Rehnquist.  Commutation “information is rele-
vant and factually accurate,” O’Connor argued.242
“Informing the jury of the Governor’s power to com-
mute a sentence of life without possibility of parole is
merely an accurate statement of a potential sentencing
alternative, and corrects the misconception conveyed by
the phrase ‘life imprisonment without possibility of pa-
role.’”243
Indeed, the Court went on to assert that without
this information “life imprisonment without possibility
of parole” would create a “misleading impression” that
release was impossible.244 The commutation instruction
“dispels that possible misunderstanding” leaving little
room for the defense to object as “surely, the respondent
cannot argue that the Constitution prohibits the State
from accurately characterizing its sentencing
choices.”245
The Court apparently had no concern that the
sentence of death – which carries with it the precise
equivalent legal possibility of commutation – is in any
way misleading because it too can result ultimately in
the defendant being set free.  As Marshall argued in the
dissent, “the instruction thus erroneously suggests to the
jury that a death sentence will assure the defendant’s
permanent removal from society whereas the alternative
sentence will not.”246
Stevens argued in the dissent that the Court
should show no tolerance for biased jury instructions.
“No matter how trivial the impact of the instruction may
be, it is fundamentally wrong for the
presiding judge at the trial - who
should personify the evenhanded ad-
ministration of justice” to provide
the jury one-sided information.247
As in Ramos, in Lowenfield
v. Phelps (1988)248 leeway that was
denied to the defense was generously
provided to the state.  In Lowenfield,
a capital jury spent thirteen hours in
sentencing deliberation and reported
to the judge that they had reached a
deadlock.  At one point, the jury re-
ported to the judge that it was expe-
riencing “much distress.”249 The
judge replied: “I order you to go
back to the jury room and to deliber-
ate and arrive at a verdict.”250
Later, when the jury again re-
ported difficulty, the judge twice
polled the jurors to ask if further deliberations would be
useful, – and reminded the jurors for what would be the
fourth time since the conclusion of the case that if they
failed to reach a verdict the defendant would be sen-
tenced to life imprisonment.  The judge’s polls, which
required the jurors to sign their name to their vote, in ef-
fect forced the jurors to take a position on the verdict
since further deliberations were necessary for a death
sentence.  After the first poll found eight in favor of con-
tinuing deliberations, the judge repeated the process and
found eleven in favor of continuing deliberations.  Just
thirty minutes after the polls the jury returned a death
sentence.  Despite the seemingly tilted nature of the
judge’s instructions, his command to continue deliber-
ating, and his repeated admonitions on the consequences
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The Court apparently
had no concern that
the sentence of death –
which carries with it
the precise equivalent
legal possibility of
commutation – is in
any way misleading
because it too can re-
sult ultimately in the
defendant being set
free. 
of deadlock (“Ladies and Gentlemen, as I instructed you
earlier if the jury is unable to unanimously agree on a
recommendation the Court shall impose the sentence of
Life Imprisonment”),251 Rehnquist wrote for the Court
that while the judge’s instruction “suggests the possibil-
ity of coercion” the instruction was “not ‘coercive’ in
such a way” as to deny the defendant’s rights.252
Ultimately, the conservative judges proved
themselves willing to tolerate sentencing definition rules
which tend to establish the defendant as a threat.
Whether that is through the withholding of information
pertaining to parole ineligibility, the one-sided presen-
tation regarding commutation possibility, or the brow-
beating of a trial judge to push the jury out of its
deadlock, the jury instruction rules that the conservative
judges support consistently provide freedom for the
prosecution and limitation on the defense.  
Even as the current Court majority has provided
for the defendant’s right to define parole ineligibility, it
is a narrow right.  Only when the prosecution seeks to
establish future dangerousness, and only when life with-
out possibility of parole is the sole available alternative
sentence does a defendant have a right to define the
meaning of life sentence.  Even in that limited instance,
however, it is clear that the right is far from firmly es-
tablished.  Kelly produced only five votes for the defen-
dant’s right to define life sentence, with two dissenters
(Thomas and Scalia) asserting there is no such right in
any circumstance.  
Creating understandable instructions
Rehnquist wrote in Buchanan v. Angelone that
the jury could not have been confused because “the in-
struction presents a simple decisional tree.”253 He meant
that metaphorically.  The practical meaning of the in-
structions in Buchanan would be difficult for any non-
lawyer to explain.  Indeed, there is no shortage of
evidence on the point that jurors have trouble under-
standing typical capital sentencing instructions.
Ironically, among the suggestions researchers
have made to improve comprehension of instructions is
to provide jurors with decision trees or flowcharts.254
That is to say, actual decision trees in which each plainly
worded question points the jurors to the next issue they
must decide, not metaphorical decision trees that exist
only in the mind of a Supreme Court justice.
Plain and direct language would also aid jurors
in carrying out their task.  As Justice Souter argued in
his concurring opinion in Simmons, jurors should be
given “instructions on the meaning of the legal terms
used”255 and when questions arise they should be an-
swered directly.  When the Simmons jury asked “Does
the imposition of a life sentence carry with it the possi-
bility of parole?”  Souter wrote, “The answer here was
easy, and controlled by state statute. The judge should
have said no.”256 Concomitantly, in his dissent in Weeks,
Justice Stevens issued a call for “clarity”257 in jury in-
structions. Should the jury fail to understand and ask a
question, a “straightforward categorical answer” should
be provided.258 At the very least, Justice Breyer sug-
gested it would be helpful if instructions on mitigation
included the “mention of mitigating evidence anywhere
in the instructions.”259
In their simulation using members of the jury
pool, one study found that rewriting juror instructions
in plain language improved juror comprehension scores
by twenty percent.260 Among the areas jurors showed the
most improvement on was the understanding of mitiga-
tion, including what counts as mitigation, what is the
standard for demonstrating mitigation, and whether
every juror must agree to apply the same mitigating
piece of evidence to find mitigation.261 Other re-
searchers have also found significantly higher compre-
hension with plain language instructions.262
Another massive jury simulation tested not only
plain language instructions, but also a flowchart instruc-
tion, and instructions with specific clarifications on
common misconceptions.263 These various instruction
forms were tested against traditional instructions.264 The
plain language instructions had the most dramatic effect,
in some areas doubling comprehension rates on such
matters as mitigation.265 Other forms of instruction also
produced gains over the traditional instructions.266
While scholars have established both the depth
of misunderstanding in response to traditional juror in-
structions, as well as the promise of user-friendly in-
structions, the Court remains largely aloof.  If the Court
is to give true effect to its expanding right to a jury,
though, it must turn away from its line of juror instruc-
tion cases in which it has established an expanding ju-
risprudence of permissible confusion.
Belief exclusion
Given the unique obligations of a capital case
juror, the Court has recognized the significant effect per-
JuRoR exClusion
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sonal values might have in inhibiting jurors from fol-
lowing their instructions and applying the law.  In With-
erspoon v. Illinois (1968) and subsequent cases, the
Court concluded that a juror could be excluded from
participating in a capital case if his views “would pre-
vent or substantially impair the performance of his du-
ties as a juror in accordance with his instructions and
oath.”267
Such exclusion applies to both those who would
never impose the death penalty as well as those who
would always impose the death sentence in a capital
case.  “[A] State may not entrust the determination of
whether a man should live or die to a tribunal organized
to return a verdict of death.”268
To give effect to this requirement, prospective
jurors are questioned during voir dire to determine their
death penalty views and if those views would impair
their ability to reach a verdict based on the law and the
evidence at hand.  In effect, the so-called “death quali-
fication” process allows the prosecution to challenge for
cause and thereby remove prospective jurors who state,
for example, that they would never vote to impose the
death penalty, and the defense to challenge and remove
the comparatively rare individual who states they would
always vote to impose the death penalty.
While the concept of death qualification is rela-
tively straightforward, the line between who is accept-
able and who is not acceptable is not always clear, nor
are the parameters of the qualification process.  More-
over, academic research makes it quite clear that death
qualification dramatically affects the makeup of juries
beyond its stated purpose.
Not surprisingly, those who can be excluded
based on their opposition to the death penalty are more
likely to pay attention to mitigating evidence269 and less
likely to accept the cost of convicting the innocent over
freeing the guilty.270 Notably, they are also less likely
to hold racist beliefs,271 more likely to remember evi-
dence, accurately understand the law, and thoroughly
weigh the evidence.272
Even more to the point, contrary to the premise
of death qualification, evidence suggests that many ex-
cludables (those who may be excluded) who oppose the
death penalty would actually be willing to impose a
death sentence.  That is, while excludables may report
an abstract unwillingness to impose the death penalty
sufficient to have them removed for cause from the jury,
when presented with evidence on specific cases, the ma-
jority report favoring the death penalty’s application for
particularly heinous murders.273
Relative to excludables, includables (those who
may be included) meanwhile are conviction prone.
Meta-analyses of studies on death penalty includables
show they are up to forty percent more likely to favor
conviction in individual cases,274 while other studies re-
veal the difference is particularly great when the evi-
dence is weakest.275
Among the factors in includables’ conviction
tendencies is their generally held belief that the prose-
cution is more trustworthy than the defense.  One jury
simulation showed participants conflicting evidence var-
iously supporting the prosecution or the defense’s posi-
tion.276 Includables were far more likely to accept the
prosecution’s perspective; in contrast to excludables, in-
cludables were more likely to fear erroneous acquittals
than erroneous convictions.277
Meanwhile, contrary to the premise of their in-
clusion, more than one fourth of includables express the
belief that the death penalty should be imposed after
every capital case conviction.278
In each of the five death qualification cases dis-
cussed below Rehnquist supported an expansive prose-
cutorial right to cleanse the jury of death penalty
skeptics and a narrow defense right to purge the jury of
death penalty enthusiasts.  In the three cases Scalia heard
and the one Thomas participated in, they joined Rehn-
quist’s position.  Overall, the thrust of the conservatives’
position is what they consider to be the state’s right to
an impartial jury and generally cast a skeptical eye on
defendant’s countervailing claims.
In Adams v. Texas (1980)279 the judge asked ju-
rors if they held any beliefs regarding the death penalty,
which would “affect their deliberations on any issue of
fact.”280 Jurors who said yes were excused.
The state argued this was a fair way to determine
death penalty excludables.  The defense countered that
the state had re-written a standard which allowed people
to be excluded only if their views “would prevent or
substantially impair” them from carrying out their duties
to a new lower standard rejecting jurors who might be
affected in any way by the weight of a death proceed-
ing.281
In an eight to one opinion (Rehnquist dissent-
ing), the Court held that Texas law had created an un-
reasonable standard which had the effect of excluding
jurors “whose only fault was to take their responsibili-
ties with special seriousness or to acknowledge honestly
that they might or might not be affected.”282
“Nervousness” and “emotional involvement”
were inherent in a death proceeding, the Court argued,
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thus the “inability to deny…any effect whatsoever” is
in no way “equivalent to an unwillingness or an inability
on the part of the jurors to follow the court’s instructions
and obey their oaths.”283
In short, the Court reaffirmed that jurors may not
be excluded “on any broader basis than inability to fol-
low the law or abide by their oaths.”284
In the dissent, Rehnquist said he could “see no
reason why Texas should not be entitled to require each
juror to swear” that he or she will be unaffected by the
possibility of a death sentence.285 Further, foreshadow-
ing an argument Scalia would offer in Holland v. Illi-
nois, Rehnquist asserted, that “society, as much as the
defendant, has a right to an impartial jury.”286
In Lockhart v. McCree (1986)287 the entire
process of death qualification was challenged as an im-
pediment to an impartial jury reflecting a cross section
of society.  Before McCree’s cap-
ital murder trial, the judge re-
moved for cause jurors who said
they could not impose death
penalty.  The jury convicted Mc-
Cree of murder but later sen-
tenced him to life imprisonment.
McCree’s attorneys argued that
the death qualification process
had created a conviction prone
jury.
In a six to three opinion
written by Rehnquist, the Court
found that death qualification did
not violate the defendant’s rights
because the Constitution “does
not require that petit juries actu-
ally chosen reflect the composi-
tion of the community at large.”288 Moreover, death
qualification does not “violate the constitutional right to
an impartial jury . . . because all individual jurors are to
some extent predisposed towards one result or an-
other.”289
Lower courts had sided with McCree, finding
that “social science evidence” showed “that ‘death qual-
ification’ produced juries that ‘were more prone to con-
vict’ capital defendants than ‘non-death qualified’
juries.”290
Rehnquist dismissed the studies because of what
he said were “several serious flaws in the evidence.”291
Quoting language used when the Court weighed the
same issue two decades earlier, Rehnquist labeled the
research “too tentative and fragmentary.”292
Some of the studies referred to in this chapter,
[for example Cowan, Thompson and Ellsworth (1984)]
were before the Court then, but were deemed of no value
because they were based on surveys and simulations,
not the deliberations of actual jurors hearing applicable
cases.  [Of course, as Marshall pointed out in dissent,
studying the deliberations of actual jurors in actual cases
is legally impossible, and not something any court
would accommodate.  Leaving surveys and simulations
“the only available means of proving their case.”]293
Rehnquist also dismissed McCree’s claim that
he was denied a jury consisting of a “fair-cross-section”
of society. 294 Death penalty excludables are not “a ‘dis-
tinctive’ group in the community[,]” thus McCree has
no right that they be included at any stage of the jury
process.295
Oddly, Rehnquist made much of the fact that
McCree’s jury, which had been
subject to death qualification,
produced a panel which could
have been the product of the
“luck of the draw.”296 Rehnquist
elaborated, “it is hard for us to
understand the logic of the argu-
ment that a given jury is uncon-
stitutionally partial when it
results from a state-ordained
process, yet impartial when ex-
actly the same jury results from
mere chance.”297
In any given case, chance
could produce an all male jury or
an all white jury.  Surely, the fact
that “mere chance” could pro-
duce a panel would not justify
any mechanism of discrimination the state wished to
create.
Rehnquist added that if one were to follow Mc-
Cree’s “illogical and hopelessly impractical” standard,
that is “if it were true that the Constitution required a
certain mix of individual viewpoints on the jury, then
trial judges would be required to undertake the
Sisyphean task of ‘balancing’ juries, making sure that
each contains the proper number of Democrats and Re-
publicans, young persons and old persons, white-collar
executives and blue-collar laborers, and so on.”298
Again, Rehnquist mixed the concepts of exclu-
sion and random chance.  It was not random chance that
created the panel McCree objected to; it was the practice
of death qualification.  As there is no political party
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chance could produce an
all male jury or an all
white jury.  Surely, the
fact that “mere chance”
could produce a panel
would not justify any
mechanism of discrimi-
nation the state wished
to create.
qualification, age qualification, or occupation qualifica-
tion for jury service, none of these factors is remotely
congruent. 
While Rehnquist dismissed the social science re-
search presented in the case, in the dissent Marshall re-
ferred to it as “overwhelming evidence that
death-qualified juries are substantially more likely to
convict.”299 Rather than questioning varying research
practices, Marshall took confidence from “the essential
unanimity of the results obtained by researchers using
diverse subjects and varied methodologies”300
Marshall noted that the death qualification
process has a disparate effect on groups more likely to
hold anti-death penalty views, thus excluding more
women and African Americans from jury service. 
Marshall suggested that capital defendants suffer
a double burden.  First, unlike defendants for other
crimes, capital defendants are burdened with a jury
which has been systematically and legally structured to
increase the likelihood of conviction.  Second, 
I cannot help thinking that respondent
here would have stood a far better
chance of prevailing on his constitutional
claims had he not been challenging a
procedure peculiar to the administration
of the death penalty.  For in no other con-
text would a majority of this Court refuse
to find any constitutional violation in a
state practice that systematically oper-
ates to render juries more likely to con-
vict, and to convict on the more serious
charges.301
Thus, the absurd possibility Marshall implied: it may be
easier to convict someone of capital murder than of a
lesser crime.
In Gray v. Mississippi (1987)302 the judge ex-
cluded a legally qualified juror for cause at the prosecu-
tion’s request.  In effect, the judge excluded the juror to
compensate the prosecutor for previous decisions the
judge made to deny the prosecutor’s earlier challenges.
This case then hinged on whether the disqualifi-
cation of a qualified juror was a sufficient error to re-
quire the case be overturned, or whether the decision
should be considered “harmless.”303
In a five to four decision written by Blackmun,
the Court employed a standard based on “whether the
composition of the jury panel as a whole could possibly
have been affected by the trial court’s error” reasoning
that “the nature of the selection process defies any at-
tempt to establish that an erroneous Witherspoon exclu-
sion is harmless.”304
In a group voir dire, jurors were asked questions
to establish whether they were death qualified.  Appar-
ently realizing that if they said they would not impose
the death penalty they would be excused, an otherwise
unprecedented number of prospective jurors announced
their opposition to the death penalty.  The judge grew
suspicious that they were misleading him to dodge serv-
ice on the jury, at one point saying, “Now I don’t want
nobody telling me that, just to get off the jury.  Now,
that’s not being fair with me.”305 Because he doubted
their sincerity, the judge began to disallow traditional
challenges for cause when jurors said they were reluc-
tant to impose the death penalty.  Instead, the prosecutor
had to use many of his nine peremptory challenges to
remove jurors who claimed to be anti-death penalty.
After exhausting his peremptory challenges, the
prosecutor sought to exclude a prospective juror, Mrs.
Bounds, who initially expressed hesitation about the
death penalty before saying she was able to impose it.
The prosecutor asked for an extra peremptory to com-
pensate for the challenges he had used on jurors the
judge refused to dismiss for cause.
Rejecting the notion of giving the prosecutor an
extra challenge, the judge instead suggested they see if
there was a way Mrs. Bounds might be excluded for
cause.  The judge told the prosecutor: “Go ask her if
she’d vote guilty or not guilty…let’s see what she says
to that. If she gets to equivocating on that, I’m going to
let her off as a person who can’t make up her mind.”306
When Mrs. Bounds said she did not know
whether she would vote guilty or not (she had, after all,
not heard any evidence since the trial had not yet
begun), the judge ruled that she was “totally indecisive.
She says one thing one time and one thing another.”307
The judge dismissed her for cause.
Admitting that the prosecutor had, in effect, lost
some of his peremptory challenges to the judge’s deci-
sion-making, Blackmun nevertheless concluded, “we
cannot condone the ‘correction’ of one error by the com-
mitment of another.”308
Meanwhile, Blackmun concluded that the im-
proper exclusion of a qualified juror could not be toler-
ated: “some constitutional rights are so basic to a fair
trial that their infraction can never be treated as harmless
error.  The right to an impartial adjudicator, be it judge
or jury, is such a right.”309
Scalia’s dissent objected to nearly every premise
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of the majority opinion.  Scalia believed the judge would
have been justified in granting the prosecution an extra
peremptory challenge, therefore Bounds would not have
been on the jury, therefore the defendant suffered no
harm when Bounds was removed for cause. 
Scalia claimed that it is “certain that the jury that
was impaneled was identical to the jury that would have
been impaneled had the trial judge not erred”310 in re-
fusing the prosecution’s earlier for cause challenges.
Later Scalia repeated his conclusion that it was “certain
that the trial judge’s decision to exclude Mrs. Bounds
for cause rather than granting that request [for an addi-
tional peremptory challenge] did not affect the compo-
sition of the jury in any way.”311 Scalia went on to say
the judge’s decision “could not possibly have affected
the composition of the jury”312 and that the resulting jury
was “identical”313 to the panel that otherwise would have
been created.  Given there was no effect on the jury, and
therefore no effect on the defendant, “There is thus no
reason to vacate petitioner’s sentence.”314
Where the authority to grant the prosecution, and
only the prosecution, extra peremptory challenges
comes from, Scalia did not specify.315 Moreover, how
he could be “certain” that the resulting jury was “iden-
tical” is also hard to fathom since, presumably, a prose-
cutor armed with an extra peremptory challenge would
weigh the acceptability of every juror with a different
standard and would therefore adjust his strategy of using
the challenges.  Both Blackmun in the majority opinion
and Powell in his concurring opinion note that the pros-
ecutor may or may not have actually excluded Bounds
if he had an extra challenge, but it is inconceivable that
he would have engaged in precisely the same series of
challenges regardless of the number of challenges he
had at his disposal.  Moreover, if the defense were to
also be granted an extra challenge in the interests of fair-
ness the notion that an “identical” jury panel would
emerge becomes even more absurd.
The year after the Court decided Gray, it was
confronted by almost the opposite set of circumstances.
Rather than removing an eligible juror at the prosecu-
tion’s request, in Ross v. Oklahoma, the judge failed to
remove an ineligible juror at the defense’s request316
In a five to four decision, Rehnquist wrote for
the Court that the judge had indeed “erred” in failing to
“remove a juror whom the trial court should have ex-
cused for cause”317 because he stated he would support
the death penalty for the defendant regardless of the ev-
idence or law.  However, since the defense was able to
strike the juror (Mr. Huling) using a peremptory chal-
lenge, the error did not compromise petitioner’s “Sixth
and Fourteenth Amendment right to an impartial
jury.”318 That is, “petitioner exercised a peremptory
challenge to remove him, and Huling was thereby re-
moved from the jury as effectively as if the trial court
had excused him for cause.”319
The standard announced in Gray (the “relevant
inquiry is whether the composition of the jury penal as
a whole could possibly have been affected by the trial
court’s error”320) suggests that the verdict must be over-
turned since Ross’ jury was indisputably affected by
what amounted to the defense’s loss of a peremptory
challenge. “Although we agree that the failure to remove
Huling may have resulted in a jury panel different from
that which would otherwise have decided the case,”
Rehnquist failed to see a reason to apply the Court’s
finding in Gray because it was  “too sweeping to be ap-
plied literally.”321
The defense’s loss of a peremptory challenge is
not a “constitutional problem” because “we reject the
notion that the loss of a peremptory challenge consti-
tutes a violation of the constitutional right to an impar-
tial jury” as “peremptory challenges are not of
constitutional dimension.”322
Oklahoma state law specifies that defendants
must use preemptory challenges to exclude jurors whom
the judge has erroneously allowed to sit.  “As required
by Oklahoma law, petitioner exercised one of his
peremptory challenges to rectify the trial court’s error,
and consequently he retained only eight peremptory
challenges to use in his unfettered discretion.  But he re-
ceived all that Oklahoma law allowed him, and therefore
his due process challenge fails.”323
To Rehnquist, “There is nothing arbitrary or ir-
rational” about such a policy as it serves “the goal of
empanelling an impartial jury.”324 This statement is
made without limitation.  Thus if the judge refused to
exclude nine ineligible pro-death penalty jurors, while
simultaneously granting prosecution challenges to anti-
death penalty jurors, effectively preserving all peremp-
tories for the prosecution while eliminating them for the
defense, there would be “nothing arbitrary or irrational”
about such an outcome.
Indeed, Rehnquist noted that loss of all peremp-
tories to correct for a judge’s error would be acceptable
because “the error is grounds for reversal only if the de-
fendant exhausts all peremptory challenges and an in-
competent juror is forced upon him.”325
Limitations on the use of peremptory challenges
are portrayed as not only reasonable but obvious.  “The
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concept of a peremptory challenge as a totally free-
wheeling right unconstrained by any procedural require-
ment is difficult to imagine.”326
Interestingly, Huling’s bias was so clear that
“had Huling sat on the jury that ultimately sentenced pe-
titioner to death…the sentence would have to be over-
turned.”327 However, Rehnquist questioned the notion
that the panel that ultimately formed was less than im-
partial because “none of those 12 jurors…was [sic] chal-
lenged for cause by petitioner.”328 Under Rehnquist’s
logic, then, when the challenge of a blatantly biased
juror is rebuffed, the defense should have responded by
challenging jurors whose responses were less egre-
giously biased.
Justice Marshall issued an angry dissent stating,
“[a] man’s life is at stake.  We should not be playing
games.”329 The logic of forcing the defense to use one
of its peremptory challenges to
correct a judge’s error was lost
on Marshall, who noted that,
“everyone concedes that the trial
judge could not arbitrarily take
away one of the defendant’s
peremptory challenges.  Yet, that
is in effect exactly what hap-
pened here.”330
Marshall could not com-
prehend how the Court could
fail to apply the Gray precedent
because “here the trial court,
rather than excusing a qualified
juror, refused to excuse a biased
juror” but “the loss of a peremptory challenge in this
case affected the composition of the jury panel in pre-
cisely the same way as the trial court’s error in Gray it-
self.”331
In Morgan v. Illinois, the prosecution requested
that the judge ask all prospective jurors if they would
automatically vote against imposing the death
penalty.332 The judge agreed.  The defense then re-
quested that the judge ask all prospective jurors if they
would automatically vote for imposing the death penalty
and the judge declined.
Recall in Ross that Rehnquist’s opinion, joined
by Scalia, asserted that, had someone who would auto-
matically vote for a death sentence “sat on the jury that
ultimately sentenced petitioner to death…the sentence
would have to be overturned.”333 Such a position seem-
ingly would lock Rehnquist and Scalia into supporting
a death qualification question on the inclination to au-
tomatically impose death, for how else would the de-
fense know of a juror’s position, and how else could the
defense act upon the rights Rehnquist discussed in Ross.
Instead, while six members of the Court found
the refusal to inquire about automatic imposition of the
death penalty to be a due process violation, Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas dissented. 
In an opinion written by White, the Court noted
that “a juror who will automatically vote for the death
penalty in every case will fail in good faith to consider
the evidence of aggravating and mitigating circum-
stances as the instructions require him to do.”334 The
state was empowered to remove anti-death penalty per-
sons from the jury with the right to ask about opposition
to capital punishment, but how could a defendant “ex-
ercise intelligently his complementary challenge for
cause against those biased persons on the venire who as
jurors would unwaveringly im-
pose death” if he could not ask
questions to identify pro-death
penalty excludables.335 Without
opportunity to ask a relevant
question of prospective jurors,
the right to challenge for cause
becomes a “meaningless”
right.336
In contrast to the prose-
cution’s direct question, the de-
fense was left to work with only
a general question about whether
prospective jurors thought they
could be fair.
Scalia’s dissent, joined by Rehnquist and
Thomas, directly contradicted the language of the Ross
decision authored by Rehnquist and signed by Scalia a
year earlier.  Gone is their conclusion that a single juror
who would automatically vote to impose death would
mean “the sentence would have to be overturned.”337 It
is replaced with a sneering renouncement of the Court’s
position in Ross, which is to say, a sneering renounce-
ment of their own position in Ross.  Scalia wrote: “The
Court today holds that a juror who will always impose
the death penalty for capital murder is not ‘impar-
tial.’”338 He added, “The Court has, in effect, now added
the new rule that no merciless jurors can sit.”339
Scalia stated that: “The fact that a particular
juror thinks the death penalty proper whenever capital
murder is established does not disqualify him” because
there is no “requirement that all jurors must, on the facts
of the case, be amenable to entertaining” a sentence less
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Marshall could not com-
prehend how the Court
could fail to apply the
Gray precedent because
“here the trial court,
rather than excusing a
qualified juror, refused to
excuse a biased juror. . . .”
than death.340
Scalia coined a new phrase when he concluded
“the Court’s exclusion of these death- inclined jurors”
is not “justified.”341
A juror who would automatically impose the
death penalty is admitting they would automatically dis-
miss any and all mitigating evidence.  Scalia sees no
problem with that because “we have held, not that he
must consider mitigating evidence, but only that he may
not, on legal grounds, refuse to consider it.”342 Thus,
Scalia distinguishes between the right to have evidence
considered and the right to not have evidence not con-
sidered (which heretofore have been amounted to the
same thing).  That is similar to the concept that, for ex-
ample, the right of criminal defendants to counsel is ef-
fectively the same as the right not to be forced to not
have counsel.
Scalia proceeded to argue that since Illinois had
absolutely no standard to define mitigation, it is per-
fectly reasonable for jurors to impose a personal stan-
dard which effectively recognized no forms of
mitigation343.
Scalia’s position that mitigation goes undefined
is somewhat harder to defend upon consulting the rele-
vant Illinois statute, which states: 
Mitigating factors may include but need
not be limited to the following: (1) the
defendant has no significant history of
prior criminal activity; (2) the murder
was committed while the defendant was
under the influence of extreme mental or
emotional disturbance, although not such
as to constitute a defense to prosecution; 
(3) the murdered individual was a partic-
ipant in the defendant’s homicidal con-
duct or consented to the homicidal act;
(4) the defendant acted under the com-
pulsion of threat or menace of the immi-
nent infliction of death or great bodily
harm; (5) the defendant was not person-
ally present during commission of the act
or acts causing death.344
Nevertheless, Scalia drew a distinction between
jurors who would never impose the death penalty and
those who would always impose the death penalty.  The
former “juror is a lawless juror,” the latter “juror to be
disqualified under the Court’s new rule is not.”345
Scalia’s point again neatly ignores the applicable
state law in the case.  Illinois law explicitly states “the
jury shall consider aggravating and mitigating factors”
– and “if the jury determines unanimously that there are
no mitigating factors sufficient to preclude the imposi-
tion of the death sentence, the court shall sentence the
defendant to death.”  Quite distinct from Scalia’s seman-
tic jumble, Morgan had a right to have mitigating factors
considered and any juror who would automatically im-
pose a death sentence was without question a “lawless
juror.”
White responded directly to Scalia’s position:
“Justice Scalia, in dissent, insists that Illinois is entitled
to try a death penalty case with one or even twelve jurors
who, upon inquiry, announce that they would automat-
ically vote to impose the death penalty if the defendant
is found guilty of a capital offense, no matter what the
so-called mitigating factors, whether statutory or non-
statutory, might be.  But such jurors obviously deem
mitigating evidence to be irrelevant to their decision to
impose the death penalty…”346 and are therefore “an-
nouncing an intention not to follow the instructions.”347
The essence of the conservatives’ holding on
death qualification is this: it is acceptable when a judge
strikes a juror for cause when that juror suggests the
slightest hesitation to impose the death penalty.  It is ac-
ceptable when a judge fails to strike for cause a juror
who says the death penalty should be automatically im-
posed.  It is acceptable when a judge goes to great
lengths questioning a juror seeking a pretense to strike
her on the prosecution’s behalf.  It is acceptable when a
judge refuses a defense request to ask even the most
basic and fundamental question regarding whether a
juror intends to follow the law.  It is acceptable that
death qualification advances the participation of convic-
tion prone jurors.  It is, in Rehnquist’s words, a defense
of the state’s right to an impartial trial.  As a Constitu-
tional matter the state holds no such right.  Nevertheless,
the conservatives’ creativity in advancing a state’s right
to impartial trials is clearly magnified by their wobbly
definition of impartial.
Trait Exclusion
While the Court has weighed the right to exclude
jurors based on their beliefs, so too has it been faced
with the even more thorny (although sometimes concur-
rent) effort to exclude jurors based on race.
Race, it would seem apparent, infects the capital
prosecution process.  For example, one study found that
an African American defendant accused of killing a
white person was eleven times more likely to be sen-
tenced to death than a white defendant accused of killing
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an African American.348 Another study indicated that
the racial imbalance reflects both an increased likeli-
hood that capital charges will be filed against the former
and an increased likelihood that once capital charges are
filed a death sentence will be returned.349 Yet another
calculated that less than two-tenths of one percent of the
executions in this country have been in response to a
white person killing an African American.350
One factor in these patterns is surely the re-
sponse of the jury.  Researchers have found notable dif-
ferences in response to the race of the defendant and the
race of the victim.351
The Court, sensitive to both the reality and ap-
pearance of bias, has at times thundered against the ex-
clusion of jurors.  In Strauder v. West Virginia (1880),
the Court confronted a state law barring African Amer-
icans from jury service.  The Court struck the law down
because: “The very idea of a jury is a body . . . com-
posed of the peers or equals of the person whose rights
it is selected or summoned to determine; that is, of his
neighbors, fellows, associates, persons having the same
legal status in society as that which he holds.”352 Jurors
must be “indifferently chosen” with regard to race to se-
cure a defendant’s right to “protection of life and lib-
erty.”353 The Court suggested that in this area the
judiciary should be held not only to a legal standard but
a societal standard because discrimination inside a
courthouse is “a stimulant to that race prejudice which
is an impediment to securing …equal justice.”354
Notable then are the efforts of Rehnquist and his
conservative colleagues a century later to defend exclu-
sion and differential treatment based on race.  While the
series of cases are not exclusively capital prosecutions,
they illustrate the foundation of their thinking as it ap-
plies to trait exclusion of jurors in capital proceedings,
and they represent the foundation of their conclusions
in the multiple hearings of the Miller-El death penalty
appeal.
In Batson v. Kentucky (1986),355 and subsequent
juror exclusion cases, the means of achieving exclusion
was the peremptory challenge.  Batson, an African
American on trial for burglary, objected to the prosecu-
tor’s use of peremptory challenges to remove all of the
prospective African American jurors from serving on his
jury.  Batson claimed a violation of the fair cross section
requirement and the due process clause of the 14th
Amendment. 
In a seven to two decision, the Court agreed.
Writing for the Court, Justice Powell concluded that “the
defendant does have the right to be tried by a jury whose
members are selected pursuant to nondiscriminatory cri-
teria.”356 Further, “the Equal Protection Clause forbids
the prosecutor to challenge potential jurors solely on ac-
count of their race.”357 To operationalize this right, the
Court ruled that if a prosecutor engages in an apparent
pattern of racial exclusion the burden will be placed on
the prosecutor to demonstrate that there was some non-
race based rationale that guided the decision on whom
to challenge.358
Rehnquist again dissented from a holding that
would protect equal access to juries.  In the process,
Rehnquist offered a strong defense of the peremptory
challenge.  “I cannot subscribe to the Court’s unprece-
dented use of the Equal Protection Clause to restrict the
historic scope of the peremptory challenge, which has
been described as ‘a necessary part of trial by jury.’  In
my view, there is simply nothing ‘unequal’ about the
State’s using its peremptory challenges to strike blacks
from the jury...”359 Thus, in addition to accommodating
the “historic” nature of peremptory challenges, Rehn-
quist accommodates the “historic” nature of racism.
Indeed, he characterized race-based thinking as
“extremely useful.”360
“The use of group affiliations, such as age, race,
or occupation, as a ‘proxy’ for potential juror partial-
ity…has long been accepted as a legitimate basis for the
State’s exercise of peremptory challenges….Given the
need for reasonable limitations on the time devoted to
voir dire, the use of such ‘proxies’ by both the State and
the defendant may be extremely useful in eliminating
from the jury persons who might be biased in one way
or another.”361
Four years after Batson, Daniel Holland objected
to peremptory challenges used by the prosecution to cre-
ate an all-white jury in his kidnapping trial (Holland v.
Illinois 1990362).  Unlike Batson, however, Holland was
white.  Holland objected to the exclusion of African
Americans on Sixth Amendment fair cross section
grounds.
In a five to four decision, written by Scalia and
joined by Rehnquist, the Court offered an even more
forceful defense of peremptory challenges.  An impartial
jury “compels peremptory challenges.”363 Scalia con-
cluded that under the Sixth Amendment we are guaran-
teed “not a representative jury…but an impartial one”364
and an impartial jury “would positively be obstructed”365
by a petit jury fair cross section requirement, because
one would have to “cripple”366 the peremptory challenge
which “would undermine rather than further the Amend-
ment’s guarantee of the right to trial by ‘an impartial
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jury.’”367
“The rule we announce today is not only the
only plausible reading of the text of the Sixth Amend-
ment, but we think it best furthers the Amendment’s cen-
tral purpose as well.   Although the constitutional
guarantee runs only to the individual and not to the
State, the goal it expresses is jury impartiality with re-
spect to both contestants.”368 Just as Rehnquist did in
Adams369, Scalia here re-writes the Sixth Amendment to
protect heretofore unmentioned (in the Constitution)
rights of the State.
While ruling against Holland’s fair cross section
claim, Scalia admitted that, an Equal Protection case
against race based juror exclusion would have merit:
We do not hold that the systematic ex-
clusion of blacks from the jury system
through peremptory chal-
lenges is lawful; it obviously
is not.  We do not even hold
that the exclusion of blacks
through peremptory chal-
lenges in this particular trial
was lawful.  Nor do we even
hold that this particular
(white) defendant does not
have a valid constitutional
challenge to such racial ex-
clusion.  All we hold is that
he does not have a valid con-
stitutional challenge based on
the Sixth Amendment.370
In fact, Scalia argues that while the Sixth Amendment
establishes only the need for a representative jury pool
not a representative jury, and was therefore satisfied in
Holland’s case, the Fourteenth Amendment by contrast
applies to both the pool and the resulting jury: “[t]he
Fourteenth Amendment’s prohibition of unequal treat-
ment in general and racial discrimination in particular
…has equal application at the petit jury and the venire
stages, as our cases have long recognized.”371
In his dissent, Marshall objected to the Court’s
distinction between the goals of an impartial jury and a
fair cross section jury, arguing that the latter goal does
not serve the former is “a false dichotomy.”372 Also,
writing in his dissent, Stevens echoed the sentiment: “A
jury that is the product of such a racially discriminatory
selection process cannot possibly be an ‘impartial jury’
within the meaning of the Sixth Amendment.”373
By refusing to apply the fair cross section re-
quirement, Marshall argued the Court empowered
“prosecutor’s systematic use of peremptory challenges
to exclude Afro-American prospective jurors on the
ground that they, as a class, lack the intelligence or im-
partiality fairly to fill the juror’s role”374
The next year Powers v. Ohio375 brought much
the same facts to the Court as did Holland.  Larry Joe
Powers was a white defendant who objected to the pros-
ecution’s use of peremptory challenges to eliminate
African Americans from his jury.  Unlike Holland, Pow-
ers advanced an Equal Protection argument rather than
a fair cross section argument.
The Court, in a seven to two decision, agreed
“The Equal Protection Clause prohibits a prosecutor
from using the State’s peremptory challenges to exclude
otherwise qualified and unbiased persons from the petit
jury solely by reason of their
race.”376
Kennedy, writing for the
Court, quoted Scalia’s opinion in
Holland stating, “as the Holland
Court made explicit, however,
racial exclusion of prospective ju-
rors violates the overriding com-
mand of the Equal Protection
Clause, and ‘race-based exclusion
is no more permissible at the indi-
vidual petit jury stage than at the
venire stage.’”377 The Court ruled
that not only the plaintiff but also
the prospective jurors themselves have a right to a se-
lection process not based on race.378 Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist, vigorously dissented from the decision
founded on Scalia’s own words.
Where Scalia asserted in Holland that the Sixth
Amendment did not apply to racial exclusion, but Equal
Protection did, a year later he realized, “What is true
with respect to the Sixth Amendment is true with respect
to the Equal Protection Clause as well.”379 In other
words, neither applied to Powers’ claim.
Scalia fumed that nothing in the Court’s decision
in Strauder380 compelled the protection of a white de-
fendant from a jury process which excluded African
Americans.  “It was not suggested in Strauder, and I am
sure it was quite unthinkable, that a white defendant
could have had his conviction reversed on the basis of”
a process which “did not exclude members of his
race.”381 Scalia did not emphasize that the case in which
“it was quite unthinkable” was decided more than 100
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The Court ruled that
not only the plaintiff
but also the prospec-
tive jurors them-
selves have a right to
a selection process
not based on race.
years earlier, in a time of rampant legal segregation.
Moreover, if Strauder was the controlling precedent in
Powers, surely it was the controlling precedent a year
earlier in Holland when Scalia wrote for the Court: “We
do not hold that the systematic exclusion of blacks from
the jury system through peremptory challenges is law-
ful; it obviously is not.”382
In a new formulation, however, Scalia realized
that the systematic exclusion of African Americans from
jury service by prosecutors’ use of peremptory chal-
lenges is actually an indication of equality.  “When that
group, like all others, has been made subject to peremp-
tory challenge on the basis of its group characteristic,
its members have been treated not differently, but the
same.  In fact, it would constitute discrimination to ex-
empt them from the peremptory strike exposure to
which all others are subject.  If, for example, men were
permitted to be struck but not women, or fundamental-
ists but not atheists, or blacks but not whites, members
of the former groups would plainly be the object of dis-
crimination.”383
That logic would support innumerable legal con-
clusions – it would be perfectly reasonable to ban
African Americans from part of a bus, say the front, if
you banned whites from part of the bus, say the back,
because in that case everyone would be barred from part
of the bus.  
Indeed, the majority casts Scalia’s position in
just such a light.  “The suggestion that racial classifica-
tions may survive when visited upon all persons is no
more authoritative today than the case which advanced
the theorem, Plessy v. Ferguson (1896).  This idea has
no place in our modern equal protection jurisprudence.
It is axiomatic that racial classifications do not become
legitimate on the assumption that all persons suffer them
in equal degree.”384
As Rehnquist argued in his Batson dissent,
Scalia reminds us that race based use of peremptory
challenges is inherently rational.  “A peremptory strike
on the basis of group membership implies nothing more
than the undeniable reality (upon which the peremptory
strike system is largely based) that all groups tend to
have particular sympathies and hostilities.”385
Scalia also reminded us that the thrust of the
Court’s thinking endangers peremptory challenges.  “To
affirm that the Equal Protection Clause applies to strikes
of individual jurors is effectively to abolish the peremp-
tory challenge.”386 Instead, peremptory challenges need
protection because they ensure that “the jury will be the
fairest possible.”387 The notion that peremptory chal-
lenges could have unconstitutional consequences “is im-
plausible” because they are “such a permanent and uni-
versal feature of our jury-trial system.”388
But that logic implies that it is impossible to use
a legal tactic for nefarious purposes.  That is the very
essence of this case; not that peremptory challenges are
unconstitutional, but that using them for racial purposes
would be.  Similarly, the state’s powers to arrest and
prosecute are “permanent and universal” features, but
nothing in their ubiquity prevents them from being mar-
shaled for discriminatory purposes and ultimately being
subject to limitation.
Finally, Scalia noted that protecting the individ-
ual juror, rather than the defendant, from exclusion is
also specious.  “We have never held, or even said, that
a juror has an equal protection right not to be excluded
from a particular case through peremptory challenge.”389
Scalia neatly overlooked a federal law.  Section 243 of
the Civil Rights Act of 1875, which was enacted as a
way to give meaning to the recently enacted Fourteenth
Amendment, provides: 
No citizen possessing all other qualifica-
tions which are or may be prescribed by
law shall be disqualified for service as
grand or petit juror in any court of the
United States, or of any State on account
of race, color, or previous condition of
servitude.
Thus, to the extent that Justice Scalia intends to say that
there is no constitutional-level guarantee that jurors are
not excluded for inappropriate reasons, he is, at least,
misleading.  In addition, to the extent that he means that
there is no support in the Constitution or federal law that
jurors have an explicit right not to be excluded for the
wrong reasons, he is wrong.
In Miller-El v. Cockrell (2003)390, the prosecu-
tion in Dallas County, Texas used 10 peremptory chal-
lenges to remove African Americans from the capital
jury.
In an eight to one decision, the Court found
“substantial evidence” of racial bias in jury selection, in
violation of principles held in Batson, and therefore re-
stored Miller-El’s ability to appeal his sentence.391
The prosecution in the case not only used
peremptories against African Americans, but treated
African Americans disparately throughout the voir dire
process.  While whites were typically asked for their
thoughts on the death penalty without preface, African
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Americans were first told what the death penalty means
and then asked the question.392 While whites were typ-
ically told what the minimum sentence would be if the
defendant was convicted and then asked if they could
impose it, African Americans were not told what the
minimum sentence was and were asked only what it
should be.  Thus, “prosecutors designed their questions
to elicit responses that would justify the removal of
African-Americans from the venire.”393
The defense unearthed evidence that discrimina-
tion against jurors was a standing practice in the prose-
cutor’s office.  A sitting judge testified that when he
worked in the prosecutor’s office, superiors had told him
not to allow African Americans on juries.   A Dallas
County district attorney memo from the 1960s –  known
to at least one of the prosecutors in the present case –
instructed prosecutors to exercise peremptory challenges
against minorities: “Do not take Jews, Negroes, Dagos,
Mexicans or a member of any minority race on a jury,
no matter how rich or how well educated.”394
Taking up the mantle of defending exclusion in
this case was Justice Thomas.  In his dissent, Thomas
called the defense’s allegations “entirely circumstan-
tial.”395
Why did the prosecutor ask whites and African
Americans different questions?  According to Thomas:
“The strategy pursued by the prosecution makes perfect
sense: When it was necessary to draw out a venireman’s
feelings about the death penalty they would use the
graphic script, but when it was overkill they would
not.”396
The slight logical flaw in that position is that the
description of execution preceded the question on the
death penalty – thus the “strategy” that “makes perfect
sense” would have also required the prosecutor to see
into the future.  Thomas concedes the point: “I recog-
nize that these voir dire statements only indirectly sup-
port respondent’s explanation because the graphic script
was typically given at the outset of voir dire—before the
above quoted veniremen had the chance to give their
stark answers.”397
Even so, after conducting his own analysis in
which he compared the treatment of individual white
and African American prospective jurors, Thomas dis-
puted that race was related to the type of questions that
the prosecutor asked.  After all, in Thomas’ calculation:
“race predicted use of the graphic script only 74% of the
time.”398
After the Court affirmed Miller-El’s right to pro-
ceed with his appeal, lower courts rejected his con-
tention that the construction of his jury was with a racial
blueprint.  Miller-El’s appeal of that conclusion would
itself be aired before the Court in 2005 in Miller-El v.
Dretke.
In a six to three decision, the Court found “clear
and convincing” evidence of racial bias indicated by the
overall pattern in jury selection (“By the time a jury was
chosen, the State had peremptorily challenged twelve
percent of qualified nonblack panel members, but elim-
inated 91% of the black ones.  It blinks reality to deny
that the State struck [jurors] because they were black.”),
the disparate questioning of white and African Ameri-
cans during voir dire, and the irreconcilable use of ex-
planations to justify the removal of African Americans
while similarly situated whites were accepted.  (“Non-
black jurors whose remarks on rehabilitation could well
have signaled a limit on their willingness to impose a
death sentence were not questioned further and drew no
objection, but the prosecution expressed apprehension
about a black juror’s belief in the possibility of refor-
mation even though he repeatedly stated his approval of
the death penalty and testified that he could impose it
according to state legal standards…”).399
To the majority, “the very integrity of the courts
is jeopardized” when prosecutors respond to potential
jurors based on “illegitimate grounds like race.”400
In a dissent joined by Rehnquist and Scalia,
Thomas again took exception to Miller-El’s claim that
race was a factor in jury selection.  Referring to the case
as “the antithesis of clear and convincing evidence,”
Thomas’s analysis found no hint of racialized thinking
or behavior.
Thomas rejected the majority’s contention that
whites and African Americans with similar voir dire re-
sponses were treated differently.  “To isolate race as a
variable,” Thomas wrote, would require that “the jurors
must be comparable in all respects that the prosecutor
proffers as important.”  In other words, a prosecutor
could never be found to violate the prohibition on using
race in jury selection because any difference the prose-
cutor identifies would justify disparate treatment.401
Indeed, Thomas noted “any number of charac-
teristics other than race could have been apparent to
prosecutors from a visual inspection of the jury panel.”
What those factors would be, other than similarly pro-
scribed gender, Thomas did not specify.
Even where prospective white and African
American jurors in Miller-El’s case were identical in
thinking, background, and all other respects, Thomas
warned that comparisons of their treatment still would
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not be meaningful.  Whites, Thomas noted, “were ques-
tioned much later in the jury selection process, when the
State had fewer peremptories to spare” thus requiring a
different strategic response.  
Thomas’ conclusion is somewhat ironic given
that his attention to comparisons of individual jurors in
the first Miller-El case was at the heart of his conclusion
that race was not a factor, and was central to the major-
ity’s interest in conducting its own comparison of indi-
vidual jurors in the second Miller-El case.  Apparently,
then, Thomas has concluded that Whites and Africans
Americans were not similarly situated enough that dif-
ferences in their treatment reveal anything about racial
disparities.  At the same time, however, he has also con-
cluded that Whites and African Americans were simi-
larly situated enough that similarities in their treatment
reveal the absence of racial disparities.
Indeed, Thomas held up several examples of
whites who were treated similarly to African Americans.
Even more forcefully, Thomas pointed to prospective
white jurors who were more favorable to the death
penalty than several African Americans, but were nev-
ertheless struck from the panel by the prosecution.  For
example, Thomas scolded the majority for failing to ex-
plain why the prosecution struck “Penny Crowson, a
white panelist who expressed a firm belief in the death
penalty.”402 Thomas’ choice of Crowson as an exemplar
of his case suggests how little foundation existed for his
position.  That is, although Thomas did not note it in his
dissent, Crowson has said in voir dire that she would.403
It is odd that Thomas used Crowson as an example of
the prosecution’s fairness.  Indeed, one wonders how
Thomas concluded Crowson had a “firm belief in the
death penalty?”404 The answer: that precise phrase,
without explanation or justification, appeared twice in
the state’s brief for the case.405
Miller-El’s case demonstrates the depth of
Thomas, Scalia, and Rehnquist’s deference to the pros-
ecution.  Even under Thomas’ highly favorable account-
ing, race accounted for 74% of the state’s questioning
pattern in voir dire.  But the prosecution said race did
not matter – so race did not matter.  But this deference
has the effect of nullifying the rights of the defendant.
Overall the racial exclusion cases demonstrate
the conservatives’ tendency to redefine the issue – first
by questioning that exclusion is wrong, then by ques-
tioning that it happens, then by questioning that it mat-
ters.   Even as Miller-El successfully appealed the
prosecution’s racial blueprint for his case, his experience
only serves to dramatize the absurdly high bar one must
clear to demonstrate discrimination in jury selection.
Miller-El had not only stark numbers on his side but a
clear and unmistakable pattern of differential treatment
infecting all phases of the jury selection process and a
documented history of racist jury selection.  In Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and Thomas’s view, the resulting right, in
effect, is not to a jury of one’s peers, but to a jury se-
lected by anything short of boastfully racist procedures.
Jury service “is not a pleasant experi-
ence in many jurisdictions” as it “tends
to be time consuming and often seem-
ingly useless from the point of view of
the prospective juror” – Justice Rehn-
quist 406
With the participation of the Court’s most con-
servative members, the right to a jury determination of
a capital defendant’s fate has expanded.  The era of
judges making factual determinations then determining
whether to apply a death sentence (for example in Ari-
zona) or judges having the power to overrule a jury’s
life sentence to impose death (for example in Florida)
are over. 
The expanded right to access a jury and have it
hold determinative power over a defendant’s life has
not, however, been accompanied by commensurate at-
tention to the instructions that guide those jurors through
the applicable law toward their verdict.  Nor have ade-
quate procedures been designed to produce a truly rep-
resentative jury panel.
In brief, the right to a jury has been enhanced
without concern for the government’s obligations nec-
essary to animate that right.  This contradiction has clear
consequences.  A capital defendant puts his life in the
hands of a group we have strong reason to suspect will
have difficulty understanding their instructions, diffi-
culty defining and applying mitigating evidence, and un-
certainty regarding the true meaning of the sentences
available to them.  Moreover, that group was assembled
systematically to be unrepresentative of community
mores.
In the cases highlighted here, dealing with miti-
gation instructions, the definition of sentences, belief
exclusion, and trait exclusion, Rehnquist, Scalia, and
Thomas have led the Court toward a laissez faire posi-
tion on the jury system.  They assert there is no problem.
ConClusion
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They offer unfalsifiable and infallible evidence that the
jury functioned properly.  If a problem arises, they assert
it has no consequence.  If it has a consequence, they as-
sert it was permissible because the problem could have
happened by chance, or was inevitable, or affected only
some jurors, or served their newly discovered state’s
right to an impartial trial.  
Even as they strongly advance their arguments,
their standards for defining an acceptable jury system
are slippery.  This is perhaps best embodied by a com-
parison of the logic raised in response to the use of
peremptory challenges.  When the state used peremptory
challenges to eliminate African Americans from the jury,
Scalia declared the right to unfettered use of peremptory
challenges must never be thwarted because the Consti-
tution’s guarantee of an impartial jury “compels peremp-
tory challenges.”407 Scalia added that peremptory
challenges are a “permanent and universal feature of our
jury-trial system”408 which serves to ensure “the jury
will be the fairest possible.”409 Similarly, Rehnquist
noted “the historic scope of the peremptory challenge,
which has been described as ‘a necessary part of trial by
jury.’”410
When a defendant lost a peremptory challenge
to a judge’s failure to remove what Rehnquist called “an
incompetent juror” the historic, permanent and univer-
sal, compelled nature of peremptory challenges took on
a different hue.411 The defense’s loss of a peremptory
was in Rehnquist’s words (joined by Scalia): not a “con-
stitutional problem” because “we reject the notion that
the loss of a peremptory challenge constitutes a violation
of the constitutional right to an impartial jury” as
“peremptory challenges are not of constitutional dimen-
sion.”412
Whether in response to peremptory challenges,
or the many other issues raised here, the conservatives
on the Court come perilously close to defining a “fair
jury” as falling within the parameters of whatever hap-
pened to occur in a particular case.  Thus, under Rehn-
quist, Scalia, and Thomas’ views, the capital
defendant’s right to access a jury expands while his
right to access an impartial jury contracts. 
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